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A Political Economy Approach to 
Reforming the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act 
By Matthew C. Turk* 
Abstract: Prohibitions against transnational bribery suffer from a paradoxical 
problem of simultaneous over- and under-enforcement.  On the “supply-side,” 
U.S. enforcement against bribery through the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
(FCPA) is increasingly over-aggressive, while enforcement by other developed 
economies is nearly non-existent.  On the “demand-side,” governments of 
developing economies where bribes take place often have neither an interest in 
nor the capacity to rein in their corrupt officials.  In light of these shortcomings, 
this Article proposes reforming the FCPA as follows.  First, the SEC should 
cease paying profits disgorged by corporate defendants into the U.S. Treasury.  
Second, disgorgements should instead be transferred to the Host country where 
bribery took place, conditional on the Host government’s cooperation with the 
FCPA investigation.  And third, if cooperation is not forthcoming, disgorgement 
proceeds should be transferred to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) Working Group—an international organization 
designed to facilitate the enforcement of the OECD Convention on Combating 
Bribery.  Reforming FCPA enforcement in this manner would re-allocate the 
proceeds from anti-bribery regulation on a global scale so as to properly align 
the incentives of the parties involved and provide greater access to the 
information required for effective enforcement. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past decade, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA or 
Act)
1
 has been one of the fastest changing areas of federal criminal and 
business law.  Passed in 1977, the Act lay in abeyance until undergoing an 
 
1 The central feature of the FCPA is its prohibition on the payment of bribes to 
foreign public officials in order to obtain business.  Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
of 1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78dd-1 to -3, 78ff (2011)).. 
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astounding enforcement boom in recent years.
2
  The dollar values at stake 
have become impressive: FCPA enforcement in 2010, for example, resulted 
in approximately $1.4 billion in combined corporate fines and penalties.
3
  
During this same period, international concern with transnational bribery 
has risen as well, situating the FCPA as the focal point and driving force of 
an increasingly complex international anti-bribery regime.
4
 
The boom in FCPA enforcement has given rise to calls for reform in 
Congress as well as in a growing body of scholarly literature.  This 
commentary is largely divided into opposing perspectives, focusing 
primarily on either under- or over-enforcement.  Research from an 
internationalist, pro-regulatory perspective argues that aggressive anti-
bribery enforcement is justified on moral
5
 or economic grounds, and that 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and Department of Justice 
(DOJ) (together, Enforcement Agencies) should sustain or even increase 
their efforts.
6
  Scholarship of a more critical “pro-business” bent argues that 
 
 2  See generally Michael B. Bixby, The Lion Awakens: The Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act—1977 to 2010, 12 SAN DIEGO INT’L L. J. 89 (2010) (providing an overview of the 
emergence of more active FCPA enforcement); Amy Deen Westbrook, Enthusiastic 
Enforcement, Informal Legislation: The Unruly Expansion of the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act, 45 GA. L. REV. 489 (2011) (same). 
 3  Peter Millar, Proactive Fraud Detection: The Truth is in the Transactions, BUS. FIN. 
(Mar. 7, 2011), http://businessfinancemag.com/article/proactive-fraud-detection-truth-
transactions-0307. 
 4  See infra Part II.C. 
 5  See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Values and Interests: International 
Legalization in the Fight Against Corruption, 31 J. LEG. STUD. S141, S146, S160 (2002) 
(“True value actors . . . treat bribery and corruption as moral wrongs, not as consequential 
goals that can be traded off against other interests . . . .  For [these] actors . . . [b]ribery and 
corruption came to be viewed as wrong in and of themselves, as a matter of principle.”); 
Marie M. Dalton, Efficiency v. Morality: The Codification of Cultural Norms in the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act, 2 N.Y.U.J.L. & BUS. 583, 592–93 (2006) (“[M]orally based anti-
bribery laws criminalize payments on the basis of their classification as bribes, regardless of 
their economic impact or considerations of efficiency.  Under the moral approach, such 
payments are universally proscribed due to their inherent unethical nature.”); Bill Shaw, The 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and Progeny: Morally Unassailable, 33 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 
689 (2000). 
 6  See Paul D. Carrington, Enforcing International Corrupt Practices Law, 32 MICH. J. 
INT’L L. 129 (2010) (advocating for more vigorous enforcement); Rebecca Koch, The 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: It’s Time to Cut Back the Grease and Add Some Guidance, 
28 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 379 (2005) (advocating for a more restrictive and precise 
definition of what constitutes an acceptable “grease payment” under the Act); Philip Segal, 
Coming Clean on Dirty Dealing: Time for a Fact-Based Evaluation of the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act, 18 FLA. J. INT’L L. 169, 170 (2006) (“This Article contends that from the 
standpoint of anyone who would wish to deter bribery abroad, the FCPA has been greatly 
under-enforced since it was enacted.”); Courtney C. Thomas, The Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act: A Decade of Rapid Expansion Explained, Defended, and Justified, 29 REV. LITIG. 439 
(2010) (defending the rise in FCPA enforcements); Sandy A. Azer, Strengthening the 
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FCPA enforcement should be scaled back, because out-of-court settlements 
with suspect legal bases and skyrocketing penalties offend traditional rule-
of-law values and deter legitimate forms of corporate investment.
7
   
Rather than advocate for either side of the severely bifurcated literature 
outlined above, this Article argues that the current model of enforcement 
against transnational bribery takes the paradoxical form of simultaneous 
under- and over-enforcement.  On the “supply-side,”8 U.S. enforcement of 
the FCPA is increasingly over-aggressive.
9
  At the same time, enforcement 
by the United States’ co-parties to a major treaty serving a similar function, 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
Convention on Combating Bribery (OECD Convention),10 is nearly non-
 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Through a Private Right of Action (Aug. 25, 2010) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1664040 (advocating for an 
additional private right of action for FCPA violations). 
 7  See Dalton, supra note 5 (advocating for a de minimis exception to FCPA violations); 
Tara Elliott, Risky Business: The Alien Tort Claims Act and the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act Expand the Reach of U.S. Courts in a Global Economy, 62 RUTGERS L. REV. 211 (2010) 
(arguing that the jurisdictional reach of the FCPA should be scaled back); Mike Koehler, The 
Façade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 907 (2010); Andrew Brady Spalding, 
Unwitting Sanctions: Understanding Anti-Bribery Legislation as Economic Sanctions 
Against Emerging Markets, 62 FLA. L. REV. 351 (2010); Westbrook, supra note 2, at 560–65 
(arguing that uncertain enforcement “takes a toll” on businesses’ efforts to comply with the 
statute); Daniel Patrick Ashe, Comment, The Lengthening Anti-Bribery Lasso of the United 
States: Recent Extra-Territorial Application of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 73 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2897 (2005); Nathan Vardi, The Bribery Racket: How the Crackdown on 
Payoffs Hurts Business and Enriches Washington, D.C. Insiders, FORBES (May 28, 2010), 
http://www.forbes.com/global/2010/0607/companies-payoffs-washington-extortion-
mendelsohn-bribery-racket.html; Andrew Weissmann & Alexandra Smith, Restoring 
Balance: Proposed Amendments to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, U.S. CHAMBER INST. 
FOR LEGAL REFORM (2010), http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/restoring-balance-
proposed-amendments-to-the-foreign-corrupt-practices-act.html; see infra Part III.A. 
 8  Investing corporations provide a “supply” of illicit payments that public officials in 
Host countries “demand” in return for illegal favors within the Host jurisdiction. 
 9  “A [recent] Dow Jones survey found that 51% of companies have delayed, and 14% 
have cancelled, business ventures abroad due to uncertainty over FCPA enforcement.”  
Joseph Yockey, Solicitation, Extortion, and the FCPA, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 781, 824 
(2011).  In response to concerns over the unpredictability of FCPA enforcement, the 
Enforcement Agencies recently issued a lengthy “guidance,” but this document has been met 
with tepid reviews.  See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CRIMINAL DIV. & U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N 
ENFORCEMENT DIV., A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 
(2012), http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/guide.pdf; see also, e.g., Joe Palazzolo & 
Christopher M. Matthews, U.S. Attempts to Clarify Antibribery Law, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 14, 
2012, 6:59 PM), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324735104578118850181434228.html 
(quoting Steven Tyrrell: “[The Guidance] does little to fill in the gray areas . . . [and is] more 
of a scrapbook of past DOJ and SEC successes than a guide book for companies who care 
about playing by the rules.”). 
 10  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Convention on 
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existent.  On the demand-side, “Host countries,” where bribery takes place, 
often have neither an interest in nor the capacity to rein in their corrupt 
officials, as is required by the United Nations Convention Against 
Corruption (UNCAC).11 
This Article applies a political economy framework to analyze 
enforcement of the FCPA and the broader international anti-bribery regime 
with which it is intertwined.  The supply- and demand-side issues described 
above are at root “political economy” problems, in the sense that they 
follow from strategies that the relevant actors rationally pursue based on 
their basic political-economic posture in relation to bribery enforcement, 
rather than from defects in the legal instruments at issue.
12
  As a result, 
these problems cannot be effectively addressed by the more “legalistic” 
solutions proposed, which commonly call for modifying statutory 
definitions or signing new, bolder treaties.
13
 
Specifically, the underlying political economy problems that lead to 
both under- and over-enforcement are threefold.  First, the U.S. 
Enforcement Agencies use the FCPA as a vehicle for public and private 
 
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, Dec. 
17, 1997, S. TREATY DOC. No. 105-43 (1998) [hereinafter OECD Convention].  The OECD 
Convention, commonly known as the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, has been ratified by 
forty countries: all thirty-four advanced economies that are members of the OECD and six 
non-member countries.  ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., CONVENTION ON 
COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 
TRANSACTIONS: RATIFICATION STATUS AS OF 20 NOVEMBER 2012 (2012), 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/antibriberyconventionratification.pdf . 
 11  The UNCAC covers most of the world’s population and has over 158 signatory states, 
including the United States.  See United Nations Convention Against Corruption, G.A. Res. 
58/4, U.N. GAOR, 58th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/422 (Dec. 9, 2003), reprinted in 43 
I.L.M. 37.  In contrast to the OECD Convention, which includes a relatively small group of 
capital exporting states, the UNCAC’s nearly universal membership covers developing 
economies, which experience the most severe problems with public sector corruption. 
 12  See Lewis Kornhauser, The Economic Analysis of Law, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-econanalysis/ (last updated Aug. 12, 2011) (providing 
a taxonomy of the various modes of “political economy” analysis of the law).  There are a 
few, early examples of political economy analyses of the FCPA, although these are from 
largely before the recent enforcement boom.  See, e.g., Daniel K. Tarullo, The Limits of 
Institutional Design: Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 
665, 679 (2004); Kevin E. Davis, Self-Interest and Altruism in the Deterrence of 
Transnational Bribery (Univ. of S. Cal. Law Sch. Research Paper Series, Olin Working 
Paper No. 99-22, 1999), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=209608. 
 13  On June 14, 2011, the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism and 
Homeland Security held a hearing on potential amendments to the FCPA.  Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, & Homeland Sec. of the 
H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 47 (2011).  Testimony included proposals to re-
write sections defining “foreign official” and “willfulness.”  See id. (statement of Michael B. 
Mukasey, U.S. Chamber Institute for Legal Reform; statement of Shana-Tara Regon, 
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers; statement of George J. Terwilliger III). 
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rent-seeking.  Second, compliance with the OECD Convention creates a 
prisoner’s dilemma-type collective action problem for OECD member 
states.  And third, Host countries often face severe resource constraints in 
domestic enforcement and have an incentive to free-ride off U.S. 
enforcement efforts.  This Article proposes a three-part reform that uses the 
narrow mechanism of the SEC disgorgement remedy
14
 to address a diverse 
but interrelated set of incentive structures that drive the political economy 
dynamics identified above.  First, the SEC should cease providing the 
proceeds from disgorgement to the U.S. Treasury.  Second, disgorged 
profits should be transferred to the Host country where the illicit payment 
took place, conditional on the Host country’s cooperation with the 
Enforcement Agencies’ investigation.  Finally, if cooperation is not 
forthcoming, disgorgement proceeds should be transferred to the OECD 
Working Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions (OECD 
Working Group or Working Group).
15
 
In contrast to the legalistic proposals aired in the literature and at 
recent congressional hearings, this Article suggests reforming disgorgement 
practices in a manner that would not directly ratchet the total level of anti-
corruption enforcement in a particular direction.  Instead, this Article’s 
proposal would re-allocate the proceeds from FCPA enforcement on a 
global scale to properly align the incentives of the parties involved and 
provide greater access to the information required for effective 
enforcement. 
First, diverting disgorgement revenue from government coffers would 
reduce the overly aggressive aspects of FCPA enforcement by mitigating 
distortions that the so-called “FCPA racket”16 has on policy decisions.17  At 
the same time, transferring disgorgements to cooperative Host countries 
 
 14  First used in the FCPA context in 2004, disgorgement is an equitable remedy rather 
than a punitive fine.  Disgorgement requires a liable party to forfeit the amount of “ill-gotten 
gain” acquired through its wrongful action.  See SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc., 
574 F.2d 90, 102 (2d Cir. 1978) (“Unlike damages, [disgorgement] is a method of forcing a 
defendant to give up the amount by which he was unjustly enriched.”); SEC v. ABB Ltd., 
No. 1:04-cv-01141 (D.D.C. 2004).  Despite its recent vintage and circuitous statutory basis, 
corporate disgorgement vastly exceeded the amount of actual penal fines levied by the SEC 
in 2008, 2009, and 2010, with 2010’s astounding $529 million in disgorgement constituting 
ninety-six percent of the SEC’s FCPA “revenue” for the year.  Mike Koehler, SEC 
Enforcement of the FCPA—2010 Year in Review, FCPA PROFESSOR (Jan. 11, 2011), 
http://fcpaprofessor.blogspot.com/2011/01/sec-enforcement-of-fcpa-2010-year-in.html. 
 15   See OECD Convention, supra note 10, art. 3. 
 16  See Vardi, supra note 7; infra Part III.A (arguing that FCPA enforcement has, to an 
extent, become a booming cottage industry within the Executive Branch that vests all parties 
involved—government prosecutors, private law firms, and the Executive Branch generally—
with a self-interest in continuously expanding the enforcement regime). 
 17  See generally infra Part III (discussing the proposal to divert disgorgement revenue 
from the U.S. government). 
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would improve the efficiency of FCPA investigations by giving foreign 
governments, with valuable access to information, a financial stake in 
successfully resolving investigations.
18
  Lastly, re-allocating disgorged 
funds to the OECD Working Group in instances of Host country 
intransigence would address supply-side under-enforcement by leveraging 
the OECD Working Group’s information-gathering and monitoring 
capabilities, thereby allowing capital-exporting countries to better self-
police compliance with the OECD Convention.
19
 
More broadly, this Article can be understood as an attempt to make 
progress in an increasingly common genre of public policy dilemmas facing 
the United States.  In a fully integrated global economy, the United States 
can no longer take a purely unilateral approach to the regulation of 
business, trade, or the environment if it hopes to be effective.
20
  Because 
opportunities for regulatory arbitrage abound,
21
 a primary consideration in 
addressing the cross-border regulatory problems of a globalized economy is 
how to construct a policy that is more strategic in its orientation than 
traditional domestic regulation.  That is, analysis and reform of new 
transnational regulation cannot be reduced to an unconditional question of 
“more” or “less” enforcement; rather, it must take account of the interests 
and capacities of the various public and private actors involved on an 
international scale.  This will require unorthodox ideas and solutions such 
as the re-allocation of proceeds from the SEC’s disgorgement remedy 
 
 18  Transfers would also help spur more general efforts by Host countries to combat the 
demand-side of corruption.  See generally infra Part IV.A (discussing the proposal to 
transfer funds to Host countries). 
 19  In addition, transfers to the OECD Working Group would provide a mechanism for 
side-payments to OECD member states that would not otherwise be inclined to comply with 
the OECD Convention.  See infra notes 314–316 and accompanying paragraph (explaining 
the role of side-payments in bargaining theory). 
 20  See, e.g., DANIEL K. TARULLO, BANKING ON BASEL: THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL 
FINANCIAL REGULATION (2008) (providing a critique of Basel II’s international coordination 
of financial firms’ capital requirements); Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Portable 
Reciprocity: Rethinking the International Reach of Securities Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 
903 (1998) (proposing a competition-based approach to international securities regulation); 
Andrew T. Guzman, Antitrust and International Regulatory Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1142 (2001) (suggesting a common antitrust regime consolidated through the World Trade 
Organization); Andrew Brady Spalding, The Irony of International Business Law, 59 UCLA 
L. REV. 354 (2011) (describing the interplay between strict U.S. regulations and lax Chinese 
regulations); Robert O. Keohane & David G. Victor, The Regime Complex for Climate 
Change, (Harvard Project on Int’l Climate Agreements, Disc. Paper No. 2010-33, Jan. 2010) 
(analyzing the costs and benefits of overlapping international carbon reduction policies). 
 21  “Regulatory Arbitrage” is defined as the process of designing transactions or business 
practices “specifically to reduce costs or capture profit opportunities created by differential 
regulation or laws.”  Frank Partnoy, Financial Derivatives and the Costs of Regulatory 
Arbitrage, 22 J. CORP. L. 211, 227 (1997); see generally Victor Fleischer, Regulatory 
Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227 (2010). 
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recommended in this Article.
22
 
This Article proceeds as follows.  Part II provides background on the 
FCPA, a critical overview of the legal basis for the SEC’s disgorgement 
practices, and an analysis of the trend towards more active transnational 
anti-bribery enforcement.  Part III argues that diverting disgorgement 
revenue from the U.S. government would reduce the incentive for over-
enforcement of the FCPA and mitigate concerns about the development of 
an “FCPA racket.”  Part IV explains the proposal to transfer disgorged 
profits to Host countries and the OECD Working Group in order to reduce 
the incentive that foreign jurisdictions have to under-invest in anti-bribery 
enforcement.  Part V provides brief concluding comments. 
II. STATUTORY STRUCTURE AND ENFORCEMENT OF THE 
FCPA 
This Part provides context for the arguments developed in Parts III and 
IV of this Article.  Subpart A reviews the FCPA’s statutory history and 
substantive provisions. Subpart B describes the statutory basis and 
underlying equitable principles of disgorgement and argues that they are 
consistent with this Article’s proposal to transfer disgorgement proceeds 
outside of the U.S. Treasury.  Subpart C reviews the domestic and 
international expansion of anti-bribery enforcement over the past two 
decades and argues that the most plausible explanations for this trend reflect 
the concerns with over- and under-enforcement that this Article’s proposal 
seeks to address. 
A. Statutory Background 
The FCPA was passed in 1977, largely as a response to the uproar 
generated by corporate bribery practices revealed during investigations into 
the Watergate scandal.
23
  The legislative history indicates that the purpose 
of the statute was to discourage unethical conduct by U.S. businesses and 
ensure the efficiency of international markets.
24
  The DOJ provided a more 
 
 22  Shifting disgorgement proceeds to third parties is actually not as radical of a policy as 
it may seem at first glance, as the SEC already has a statutory mechanism for establishing a 
fund to transfer disgorged profits to third parties through the Sarbanes-Oxley “Fair Funds” 
provisions.  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 308, 15 U.S.C. § 7246 (2011); see also infra Part 
II.B (arguing that the equitable and legal principles underlying the disgorgement remedy cut 
in favor of transferring forfeited profits to the non-U.S. third parties identified in this 
proposal). 
 23  See STUART H. DEMING, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT AND THE NEW 
INTERNATIONAL NORMS 1 (2005); Bixby, supra note 2, at 92. 
 24  See H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 4 (1977) (“[Bribery] rewards corruption instead of 
efficiency and puts pressure on ethical enterprises to lower their standards.”); Foreign and 
Corporate Bribes: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs, 
94th Cong. 76 (1976) (“Bribery corrodes the confidence that must exist between buyer and 
 A Political Economy Approach to Reforming the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
33:325 (2013) 
333 
recent articulation of the Act’s purpose: “Congress enacted the FCPA to 
bring a halt to the bribery of foreign officials and to restore public 
confidence in the integrity of the American business system.”25  The FCPA 
is enforced by the SEC, which can only bring civil penalties, and the DOJ, 
which is responsible for certain civil suits and all criminal prosecutions.
26
  
However, the SEC and DOJ often enforce the Act through joint 
investigations and settlement negotiations.
27
 
The substantive prohibitions of the Act come in two forms: anti-
bribery provisions and books-and-records provisions.  The anti-bribery 
provisions define a prohibited act as comprising the following elements: 
(1) a payment, offer, or promise of; 
(2) anything of value; 
(3) to any foreign official or any other person while knowing that all 
or part of the payment will be passed along to a foreign official; 
(4) with corrupt intent; 
(5) for the purpose of influencing an official act or decision of the 
person; 
(6) to assist in obtaining or retaining business for or with or directing 
business to, any person.
28
 
Books-and-records provisions concern the keeping of corporate 
accounting records that conceal illicit payments.  They require an issuer to 
“make and keep books, records, and accounts which, in reasonable detail, 
accurately and fairly reflect the transaction and dispositions of the assets of 
 
seller if domestic and international commerce is to flourish.”).  Amid domestic outcry, there 
was also the foreign policy goal—as evidenced by the statements of lawmakers during 
deliberations on the Act—to secure a positive reputation for U.S. corporations overseas in 
order to maintain Cold War alliances.  See Spalding, supra note 7, at 378–90 (arguing this 
point through a detailed review of the legislative record). 
 25  The Lay Person’s Guide to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Antibribery Provisions,, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/docs/lay-persons-
guide.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2012) [hereinafter Lay Person’s Guide]. 
 26  See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CRIMINAL DIV. & U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N 
ENFORCEMENT DIV., supra note 9, at 4–5. 
 27  See David C. Weiss, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, SEC Disgorgement of 
Profits, and the Evolving International Bribery Regime: Weighing Proportionality, 
Retribution, and Deterrence, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 471, 478 (2009) (“The agencies often work 
together to bring parallel criminal and civil proceedings against the same party.  In 
investigations involving issuers over which both agencies have jurisdiction, informal 
cooperation—rather than formal policy—determines the agency that will actually conduct 
the investigation.”) (citing Paul V. Gerlach & George B. Parizek, The SEC’s Enforcement of 
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, in 3 FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES REPORTER 14-1, 14-3 
(West 2d ed. 2008)). 
 28  See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a) (2011). 
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the issuer.”29 
The FCPA has an extremely broad jurisdictional reach.  The 
jurisdictional hook of the Act covers three types of actors who make illicit 
payments in foreign jurisdictions: (i) “issuers”;30 (ii) “domestic concerns”;31 
and (iii) “any person” that has contact with U.S. territory in furtherance of 
the illegal bribe.
32
  A sufficiently liberal interpretation of the “any person” 
provision has allowed the Enforcement Agencies to reach “both foreign 
business entities as well as foreign nationals, for the bribery of public 
officials in their own country, as well as those of other foreign nations.”33 
Although the FCPA was not vigorously enforced during its first 
decade, corporate lobbying pressure mounted against the perceived severity 
of the Act and its detrimental effect on the international competitiveness of 
U.S. corporations, and resulted in the FCPA being amended in 1988 (1988 
Amendments).
34
  The 1988 Amendments, part of the Omnibus Trade and 
Competitiveness Act of 1988,
35
 altered the FCPA by tinkering with the 
 
 29  Id. § 78m(b)(2)(A).  While the anti-bribery provisions require a specific intent to make 
a corrupt payment, a books-and-records violation is subject to strict liability, with the 
qualification that criminal liability can only attach to persons “knowingly” violating the 
provision.  Id. § 78m(b)(5) (“No person shall knowingly circumvent or knowingly fail to 
implement a system of internal accounting controls or knowingly falsify any book, record, or 
account described in paragraph (2).”); see also H.R. REP. NO. 100-576, at 916, 919–21 
(1988) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1547, 1952–54 (suggesting that a 
“head in the sand” approach would violate the accounting provisions). 
 30  The term “issuers” includes companies that offer registered securities in the United 
States or that are required to file periodic reports with the SEC, as well as their officers, 
directors, employees, agents, or stockholders acting on their behalf.  15 U.S.C. § 
78m(b)(2)(A). 
 31  See id. § 78dd-2. 
 32  See id. § 78dd-3.  These jurisdictional provisions were added by the 1998 
Amendments to the FCPA.  International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, 
Pub. L. No. 105-366, sec. 2(c)(1), § 78dd-1(g), sec. 2(d), § 78dd-3, sec. 3(d)(1), § 78dd-2(i), 
112 Stat. 3302, 3303–04, 3305 (amended 1998) (§§ 78dd-1(g) (for issuers),  78dd-2(i) (for 
domestic concerns), 78dd-3 (for any persons)). 
 33  See Bixby, supra note 2, at 101 (summarizing the provision similarly by arguing that 
“[t]his change suggests that the FCPA can reach foreign agents and employees of domestic 
concerns, as well as U.S. nationals living anywhere in the world who have very little contact 
with the United States”); Ashe, supra note 7, at 2898 (citing as an example: ABB Ltd., 
Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Act Release No. 2049, 83 SEC Docket 849 (July 6, 
2004)). 
 34  Steven R. Salbu, Bribery in the Global Market: A Critical Analysis of the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 229, 243 (1997) (“Critics contended that 
U.S. businesses shunned legitimate transactions, the legality of which was difficult to assess 
under the statute’s ambiguous language.”). 
 35  Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, secs. 5001–
5003, §§ 103(a)–104, 102 Stat. 1107, 1415–25 (amending 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b), 78dd-1, 
78dd -2, 78ff (1988)). 





 creating two affirmative defenses, and adding an 
express “facilitating payments” exception.37  In addition, the 1988 
Amendments exhorted the U.S. government to pursue an international anti-
bribery treaty in order to “level the playing field” for U.S. corporations who 
saw themselves as singled out for policing under the Act while foreign 
corporations in other developed countries bribed with impunity.
38
  The last 
round of FCPA amendments was the International Anti-Bribery and Fair 
Competition Act of 1998 (1998 Amendments), which brought the Act into 
greater conformity with the 1997 OECD Convention’s requirements.39  
Specifically, the 1998 Amendments expanded the FCPA’s jurisdiction to 
cover foreign corporations or natural persons by inserting the 
aforementioned language that makes the anti-bribery provisions applicable 
to “any person” that has territorial contact with the United States in 
furtherance of a bribe, whether or not they are a U.S. issuer or domestic 
concern.
40
  Incorporating a capacity to apply the FCPA’s prohibitions to 
foreign corporations or natural persons was consistent with the United 
States’ goal in pushing for the OECD Convention41 to “even the playing 
 
 36  The knowledge requirement was (arguably) narrowed from a “reason to know” or 
negligence standard to a requirement of actual knowledge that the payment was a bribe to a 
foreign official or willful blindness as to that fact.  See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f)(2)(A).  This 
amendment was not much of a restriction in practice, because, as attorney Deming notes, 
“the ‘reason to know’ standard was never applied by the Justice Department” and the actual 
knowledge requirement as amended “continued to be expansive.”  DEMING, supra note 23, at 
31–32. 
 37  Congress created affirmative defenses for any payments that are prohibited but would 
be legal under the “local laws” of the foreign jurisdiction and also for “reasonable and bona 
fide” business expenditures “directly related to . . . the promotion, demonstration, or 
explanation of products or services.  See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(c)(1) to -3(c)(1) (the “local 
law” defense); id. §§ 78dd-1(c)(2)(A) to -2(c)(2)(A) (the “promotional expenses” defense).  
Like the new knowledge standard, these new affirmative defenses have done little to relax 
the FCPA’s bite in practice and have never been successfully invoked in court.  See 
generally Kyle P. Sheahen, I’m Not Going to Disneyland: Illusory Affirmative Defenses 
Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 28 WIS. INT’L L.J. 464 (2010).  “Facilitating 
payments,” also known as “grease payments,” are made to “secure or accelerate performance 
of a nondiscretionary act that an official is already obligated to perform.”  15 U.S.C. § 78dd-
1(b); DEMING, supra note 23, at 15. 
 38  See H.R. REP. NO. 100-576, at 924 (1988) (Confr. Rep.), reprinted in 1988 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1547, 1957; Tarullo, supra note 12, at 674–75 (citing the “level playing field” 
concern as one of the legislative purposes behind the 1988 Amendments). 
 39  International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-366, 
112 Stat. 3302 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3, 78ff (2011)). 
 40  See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(g) (for issuers); id. § 78dd-2(i) (for domestic concerns); 
OECD Convention, supra note 10, art. 4.1 (“Each Party shall take such measures as may be 
necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the bribery of a foreign public official when the 
offence is committed in whole or in part in its territory.”); supra note 30 and accompanying 
text. 
 41  John Gibeaut, Battling Bribery Abroad, A.B.A. J., Mar. 18, 2007, at 50–51 (“As the 
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field” for U.S. businesses operating abroad.42 
B. Legal Basis and Equitable Principles of Disgorgement Remedy 
Disgorgement is a civil remedy with roots in the traditional equitable 
remedies of restitution and recoupment.
43
  Imposition of the disgorgement 
remedy requires corporations subject to FCPA liability to forfeit the amount 
of “ill-gotten gain” arising from the bribery at issue.  Use of the 
disgorgement remedy is a recent but growing practice on the part of the 
SEC.  In fact, the SEC never sought disgorgement in the FCPA’s first 
twenty-seven years, until the ABB Ltd. settlement in 2004.44  Since 2004, 
the SEC has sought disgorgement “in virtually every” case it has brought,45 
collecting over $1 billion in disgorgement and related prejudgment interest 
in more than sixty FCPA proceedings.
46
  In 2010, ninety-six percent of the 
proceeds from SEC FCPA settlements consisted of disgorgement and 
prejudgment interest, a total amounting to approximately $500 million.
47
 
The SEC’s legal basis for requiring disgorgement in connection with 
FCPA violations is complicated and “achieved through interrelated statutes 
 
United States ramped up the FCPA in 1998, it also persuaded the 30 industrialized nations 
belonging to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development to sign a treaty 
agreeing to adopt similar laws.”); Spalding, supra note 7, at 391–92 (discussing U.S. 
interests in the OECD Convention). 
 42  Presidential Statement on Signing the International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition 
Act of 1998, 34 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 2290, 2290 (Nov. 10, 1998) (“U.S. companies 
have had to compete on an uneven playing field, resulting in losses of international contracts 
estimated at $30 billion per year.”) [hereinafter Presidential Statement]. 
 43  Disgorgement is therefore technically not a “penalty” and is not intended to punish the 
defendant.  See SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec., Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 102 (2d Cir. 1978) 
(“Unlike damages, [disgorgement] is a method of forcing a defendant to give up the amount 
by which he was unjustly enriched.”); Elizabeth S. Stong, Basics of the SEC’s Disgorgement 
Remedy, 43 PRAC. LAW. 67, 69 (1997). 
 44  See Consent of Defendant, SEC v. ABB Ltd., No. 1:04-cv-01141 (D.D.C. Nov. 30, 
2004), available at 
http://fcpa.shearman.com/files/d80/d80f39308746a9feec133667a06bb452.pdf?i=9c0b79cfc7
dfb7164daa6be68ea8f5a6. 
 45  Philip Urofsky & Danforth Newcomb, Recent Trends and Patterns in FCPA 
Enforcement, FCPA DIGEST (Shearman & Sterling LLP, New York, New York, N.Y.), Oct. 
1, 2009, at x, http://www.shearman.com/files/upload/LT-100209-FCPA-Digest-Recent-
Trends-and-Patterns-in-FCPA-Enforcement.pdf. 
 46  Paul R. Berger et al., Do FCPA Remedies Follow FCPA Wrongs?, FCPA UPDATE 




 47  The breakdown is as follows: $529,967,294 in total settlements; $20,182,000 in civil 
penalties; $509,785,294 in disgorgement and prejudgment interest.  See Koehler, supra note 
14. 
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showing no clear congressional intent that disgorgement apply to FCPA 
prosecutions.”48  The SEC’s fining authority under the FCPA was added in 
the 1988 Amendments and is provided in § 32(c) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act),
49
 but  this section only allows for fines 
of up to $600,000 per violation by an issuer.  Instead of relying on § 32(c), 
the SEC resorts to its general civil fining authority under § 21(d)(3) of the 
1934 Act
50
 in combination with the 1990 Penny Stock Reform Act, which 
amended the 1934 Act to grant the SEC statutory authority to impose 
disgorgement.
51
  While not explicitly disallowed by the FCPA, the “lack of 
any statement that disgorgement should be part of the SEC’s enforcement 
arsenal, and the rarity of the remedy at the time that Congress passed the 
FCPA and its amendments”52 have led some to question the propriety of the 
remedy.
53
  As with many aspects of the FCPA, the exact contours of the 
SEC’s disgorgement authority have never been tested in court.54 
The passage of Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX)
55
 in 2002 provided important 
modifications to the SEC’s remedial authority, including a “Fair Funds for 
Investors” provision that allows the agency to decide whether to contribute 
proceeds from disgorgement to the U.S. Treasury or to a special fund for 
 
 48  Weiss, supra note 27, at 499. 
 49  Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 32(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(c) (2006)). 
 50  Weiss, supra note 27, at 497. 
 51  Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 
101-429, secs. 202–203, §§ 21B–21C, 104 Stat. 931, 937, 939 (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. §§ 78u-2(e), 78u-3(e) (2011)); Weiss, supra note 26, at 485.  Previously the SEC’s 
ability to demand disgorgement rested entirely on caselaw.  See SEC v. Commonwealth 
Chem. Sec., Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 102 (2d Cir. 1978).   
 52  Weiss, supra note 27, at 497 (“Neither the reports of the House or Senate floor 
discussion of the FCPA or its subsequent amendments, nor the 1981 follow-up report from 
the U.S. General Accounting Office on corporate bribery and the FCPA, mention 
disgorgement as a remedy.”) (citing H.R. 3815, 95th Cong., 123 CONG. REC. 36,303–08 
(1977); S. 305, 95th Cong., 123 CONG. REC. 13,816–23 (1977); H.R. REP. No. 95-831 (1977) 
(Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4121; H.R. REP. No. 95-640 (1977); S. REP. 
No. 95-114 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098; ; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY 
OFFICE, AFMD-81-34, IMPACT OF FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT ON U.S. BUSINESS 
(1981)). 
 53  See James R. Doty, Toward a Reg. FCPA: A Modest Proposal for Change in 
Administering the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 62 BUS. LAW. 1233, 1237 n.13 (2006) 
(“The propriety and legality of [FCPA disgorgements] have not been tested in the courts.  
Whether Congress intended the equitable disgorgement remedy to subsume the FCPA’s  
express fining provisions is the issue.”). 
 54  Weiss, supra note 27, at 486. 
 55  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); see also 18 U.S.C. § 981(i) (2011) (amended 2012) 
(providing for civil or criminal forfeiture of property and transfer to eligible foreign 
countries that participated in the seizure of that property). 
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  In theory, the SEC has the legal authority to transfer 
disgorgement proceeds into a fund for shareholders of the corporation 
charged with violating the FCPA, but this has not happened in practice.  
And rightly so: it is difficult to see how shareholders are “victimized” by 
corporate bribes that procure business overseas and increase corporate 
profits.
57
  Returning the profits from bribes to shareholders of bribing 
companies merely reinstates the original “unjust enrichment.”58  But the 
policy option created by the Fair Funds provision does reflect an implicit 
understanding that the disposition of disgorgement can serve a 
compensatory function, with the “victim” as the appropriate recipient. 
The equitable principles underlying disgorgement also cut in favor of 
the compensatory policy animating the Fair Funds provision.  
Disgorgement is a sub-class of restitutionary remedies in which the wrong-
doer is “restored” to its original position before receiving the ill-gotten 
benefit.
59
  Most narrowly understood, then, it does not matter who is the 
recipient of disgorged funds.  However, in cases where there is no other 
compensatory mechanism available, it seems only natural that the party that 
has suffered harm be the recipient.  This policy is reflected in the original 
Restatement of Restitution itself, which provides that “a person who has 
been unjustly enriched at the expense of another is required to make 
restitution to the other.”60 
The most plausible party harmed by FCPA bribes is the Host country, 
which has seen its legal system undermined and its public officials 
corrupted through the illicit payments.
61
  In fact, the U.K. has already begun 
 
 56  See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 308. 
 57  See Verity Winship, Fair Funds and The Compensation Conundrum, 60 FL. L. REV. 
1103, 1123–37 (2008) (arguing that investor compensation through the Fair Funds 
mechanism only makes sense under narrow circumstances inapplicable to the FCPA). 
 58  See id. at 1118 (“The passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 brought a new twist, 
changing the disposition of the money penalties so that the penalties began to serve the dual 
purpose of deterring potential violators of the securities laws and compensating harmed 
investors.”). 
 59  Another way to conceptualize disgorgement is as the mirror-image of expectation 
damages in contract law: “[D]isgorgement places the promisor in the position that she would 
have been in had the contract had been performed.  Accordingly, perfect disgorgement 
would make the promisor indifferent between performing, on the one hand, and paying 
damages, on the other.”  Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Disgorgement Interest in Contract Law, 
105 MICH. L. REV. 559, 561 (2006). 
 60  RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION § 1 (1937). 
 61  This has been recognized by a recent U.N. report on transnational bribery.  See U.N. 
High Comm’r for Human Rights, Comprehensive Study on the Negative Impact of the Non-
repatriation of Funds of Illicit Origin to the Countries of Origin on the Enjoyment of Human 
Rights, in Particular Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Ann. Rep. of the U.N. High 
Comm’r for Human Rights, ¶ 59, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/19/42 (Dec. 14, 2011) (“[D]isgorgement 
of profits is a remedial measure that forces a defendant to ‘return’ the profits of crime to the 
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to embrace this position under its recently-enacted Bribery Act by requiring 
corporate defendant Mabey & Johnson Ltd. to disgorge £123,000 to the 
jurisdiction where the underlying violations occurred in order to 
“compensate [the] victims.”62  Another candidate for compensation is the 
capital-exporting OECD countries whose companies are forced to compete 
in an international marketplace distorted by corruption.  FCPA expert Mike 
Koehler makes the point in a straightforward fashion: 
I do not know what the exact answer [concerning the recipient of 
disgorgement] should be, but I am comfortable in my conclusion that 
the best answer is not $703 million (USD) solely to the U.S. 
Treasury because a French, Dutch, and Italian company allegedly 
bribed Nigerian officials—something that actually happened over a 
10-day period earlier this summer.
63
 
Koehler’s common sense intuition is consistent with the equitable basis of 
the SEC’s FCPA disgorgement authority, and informs this Article’s 
proposal to transfer disgorgement to Host countries or the OECD Working 
Group. 
In summary, both the theory and practice surrounding the SEC’s use of 
disgorgement reinforce this Article’s proposal for several reasons.  First, the 
SEC’s legal basis for requiring disgorgement, while likely sound on a 
technical level,
64
 is nonetheless convoluted and has no real historical 
pedigree in the FCPA context.  Calls for departure from the status quo, 
therefore, would not upset any settled or long-standing legal practice.  In 
addition, neither the Fair Funds mechanism provided by SOX, nor the 
equitable principles underlying the disgorgement remedy require the U.S. 
 
State, an objective aligned with the purposes of returning assets at the country of origin.”). 
 62  See U.K. Bribery Act, c. 23, § 19 (2010); Mike Koehler, A Conversation with Richard 
Alderman- Director of the United Kingdom Serious Fraud Office, Oct. 4, 2010 (unpublished 
responses to questions), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1687299 (noting Mr. Alderman remarks 
on the Mabey & Johnson settlement: “The SFO [Serious Fraud Office, the U.K.’s Bribery 
Act enforcement agency,] has been looking for ways in which to compensate victims in 
countries in respect of which U.K. corporates have committed offences. This is a difficult 
area because, while the victims will have suffered as a result of poor infrastructure etc., they 
have no claim to compensation in a way that victims of fraud have.”); Richard L. Cassin, 
Breakthrough in Britain, FCPA BLOG (Sept. 29, 2009, 8:02 PM), 
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2009/9/30/breakthrough-in-britain.html (discussing the 
Mabey & Johnson settlement). 
 63  See Mike Koehler, Professor, Butler Univ., Opening Remarks at the World Bribery & 
Corruption Compliance Forum 2010, at 4 (Sept. 14–15, 2010) (transcript available at 
http://www.scribd.com/doc/37367261/World-Bribery-and-Corruption-Compliance-Forum-
Opening-Remarks-of-Professor-Mike-Koehler). 
 64  See supra note 51 and accompanying text (citing powers granted to SEC by the Penny 
Stock Reform Act amendment). 
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Treasury to be the ultimate recipient of disgorgement revenue.  Instead, 
both the Fair Funds provisions and disgorgement’s equitable principles cut 
in favor of transferring disgorged profits to harmed third parties, including 
Host countries or OECD Convention members.  A final point, discussed in 
more detail below, is that disgorgements pursuant to FCPA settlements are 
not only escalating in size, but are also often imposed in an arbitrary or 
disproportionate manner.
65
  These trends reflect certain conflicts of interest 
at work in the enforcement process that could be mitigated by transferring 
disgorgement from the SEC to third parties.
66
 
C. Increase in Anti-Bribery Efforts 
The rise of FCPA enforcement over the past decade is the most 
striking feature of the Act, which has undergone only modest textual 
change since 1977, and no change at all since 1998.  The increase in FCPA 
enforcement has also paralleled the enactment of anti-bribery statutes and 
treaties by other international actors.  These trends present various puzzles 
that require explanation to fully understand the contours of current 
transnational anti-bribery efforts. 
In addition to positive analysis, this subpart argues that the best 
explanations for enforcement trends underline concerns that support this 
Article’s main arguments.  For one, the expansion of anti-bribery efforts at 
the international level means U.S. policy on foreign bribery should be 
strategic and international in scope, taking into account the interests and 
capacities of other international parties FCPA enforcement will inevitably 
become intertwined with.
67
  The rapid expansion of FCPA enforcement 
over a short timeframe also raises the concern that enforcement strategies 
have been unbalanced and overly aggressive—the “over-enforcement” 
problem Part III of this Article seeks to address.  At the same time, the 
proliferation of international agreements concerning corruption—and the 
extent to which they have been embraced by both advanced and developing 
economies—reflects a collective recognition that corruption is a serious 
global problem, and animates the proposals for improving deterrence laid 
out in Part IV. 
1.  The Trend Towards More Enforcement 
FCPA enforcement in recent years has expanded across almost every 
conceivable dimension, including: (a) the number of investigations initiated 
and cases settled; (b) the size of penalties imposed; and (c) the scope of 
 
 65  See infra Part III.B for a critique of the SEC’s methods for calculating disgorgement. 
 66  See infra Part III.A (describing the rent-seeking dynamic within the Enforcement 
Agencies). 
 67  See supra notes 20–21 and accompanying text. 
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jurisdictional and substantive legal theories put forward by the Enforcement 
Agencies.  These trends stand to continue or even accelerate, as both the 
SEC and DOJ have announced new and ambitious plans for 
institutionalizing a robust FCPA enforcement regime.
68
  These plans have 
been accompanied by similar efforts on an international scale. 
From 1977 to 2003, the Enforcement Agencies pursued an estimated 
total of sixty cases, or slightly more than two FCPA cases per year.
69
  After 
2004, however, the number of both SEC and DOJ enforcement actions rose 
for six consecutive years, culminating in 2010 when the SEC and DOJ 
pursued twenty-six and forty-eight actions, respectively.
70
  Table 1 below 




Table 1: FCPA Enforcement Actions, 2004–2011 
2004 2005 2006 2007 
DOJ  SEC  DOJ SEC DOJ SEC DOJ SEC 
3 2 5 7 8 7 20 18 
2008 2009 2010 2011 
DOJ  SEC  DOJ SEC DOJ SEC DOJ SEC 
13 20 14 26 48 26 25 23 
 
The size of penalties per enforcement action has followed the same 
rising trajectory as the number of actions.
72
  The Enforcement Agencies set 
records for the amount of total penalties levied each year from 2007 to 
2010,
73
 with the ten largest dollar penalties from this period,
74
 eight of 
which resulted from settlements reached in 2010.
75
  Activity slowed down 
 
 68  See, e.g., infra notes 87–90 and accompanying text. 
 69  See Bixby, supra note 2, at 103 (noting that between the FCPA’s enactment in 1977 
and amendment in 1998, the DOJ brought a total of twenty-five criminal prosecutions); 
Westbrook, supra note 2, at 522, n. 171 (providing a similar estimate). 
 70  2011 Year-End FCPA Update, GIBSON DUNN (Jan. 3, 2012), 
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/2011YearEndFCPAUpdate.pdf. 
 71  Table 1 is adapted from Gibson Dunn’s 2011 Year-End FCPA Update.  See id. 
 72  See Bixby, supra note 2, at 109 (“[N]ot only by the numbers of cases, but also by the 
amount of fines, fees, and penalties levied against the defendants”). 
 73  Westbrook, supra note 2, at 555–56. 
 74  Weissman & Smith, supra note 7, at 2. 
 75  2010 Year-End FCPA Update, GIBSON DUNN (Jan. 3, 2011), 
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/2010YearEndFCPAUpdate.pdf.  The 
two largest payouts by 2010 were the settlements with Siemens in 2008 ($800 million) and 
KBR/Halliburton in 2007 ($579 million), with several settlements of equally staggering 
magnitude reached in 2010.  Id.  The largest 2010 settlements include: BAE Systems PLC 
($400 million); Snamprogetti/ENI ($365 million); Technip ($338 million); Daimier AG 
($185 million); and Alcatel-Lucent ($137.4 million).  Id. 
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only slightly during 2011, in which the Enforcement Agencies “collected 
approximately $652 million.”76  This general upward trend applies with 




The jurisdictional reach of the FCPA has also expanded over the past 
dozen years to include parties, such as foreign entities and individuals, who 
were not previously subjected to active enforcement under the statute.
78
  
While enforcement actions against individuals were relatively unheard of 
before 2006, the Enforcement Agencies pursued charges against ten 
individual defendants in that year and against fifteen individuals in 2007.
79
  
FCPA enforcement has also been increasingly directed at foreign 
corporations.  The first criminal action against a non-U.S. party was in 2006 
against Statoil ASA for payments to Iranian officials.
80
  But non-U.S. 
defendants have become more common since then: nine of the ten largest 
FCPA settlements ever were imposed on non-U.S. corporations over 2010 
and 2011,
81
 and every enforcement action instituted in the first quarter of 




The reach of the FCPA during the recent enforcement boom has been 
aided in large part by the aggressive legal theories of the Enforcement 
Agencies concerning key statutory language.  For example, the DOJ has 
stated that—because foreign businesses that receive bribes are often state-
owned enterprises—its interpretation of what constitutes a “foreign official” 
is broad enough so that “nearly every aspect of the approval, manufacture, 
import, export, pricing, sale and marketing of a drug product in a foreign 
 
 76  Mike Koehler, 2011 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Year in Review, 7 WHITE COLLAR 
CRIME REP., Jan. 27, 2012, at 80, 82, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1992616. 
 77  See supra Part II.B. 
 78  See generally Ashe, supra note 7. 
 79  Bixby, supra note 2, at 111.  This trend has not let up, with sixteen individual 
defendants in 2008 and forty-two individuals defendants in 2009, a year one major law 
firm’s FCPA publication referred to as “the year of the individual.”  Cases and Review 
Releases Relating to Bribes to Foreign Officials Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 
1977, FCPA DIGEST (Shearman & Sterling, LLP, New York, N.Y.), Mar. 2010, at ii, 
http://www.shearman.com/files/upload/FCPA-Digest-Spring-2010.pdf [hereinafter Cases 
and Review Releases]. 
 80  See In re Statoil, ASA, Exchange Act Release No. 54599, 2006 WL 2933839 (Oct. 13, 
2006). 
 81  Paul R. Berger et al., The FCPA in 2011: The Year of the Trial Shapes FCPA 
Enforcement, FCPA UPDATE (Debevoise & Plimpton LLP, New York, N.Y.), Jan. 2012, at 8; 
Richard L. Cassin, In New Top Ten, Eight Are Foreign, FCPA BLOG (Nov. 5, 2010), 
http://fcpablog.squarespace.com/blog/2010/11/5/in-new-top-ten-eight-are-foreign.html 
(listing the top ten settlements reached in FCPA cases). 
 82  Berger et al., supra note 81; Cases and Review Releases, supra note 79, at v. 
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country will involve a ‘foreign official’ within the meaning of the FCPA.”83  
Other examples include a large but amorphous interpretation of what it 
means to “obtain or retain business,”84 as well a generous approach to the 
condition that “anything of value” may constitute a bribe, which was 
construed in one case to include campaign t-shirts.
85
  In practice, the anti-
bribery provisions’ “actual knowledge” or “willful” blindness requirements 
have been applied on a constructive knowledge or “has reason to know” 
basis.
86
  And, recent cases under § 20(a) of the 1934 Act have used a 
“control person” theory to create a strict liability standard for parent 
 
 83  Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice, Prepared Keynote Address to 
the 10th Annual Pharmaceutical Regulatory and Compliance Congress and Best Practices 
Forum (Nov. 12, 2009) (transcript available at 
www.ehcca.com/presentations/pharmacongress10/breuer_2.pdf).  The OECD Convention’s 
definition pales in comparison.  See OECD Convention, supra note 10, art. I(4)(a)  
(“‘[F]oreign public official’ is defined as ‘any person holding a legislative, administrative or 
judicial office of a foreign country, whether appointed or elected; any person exercising a 
public function for a foreign country, including for a public agency or public enterprise; and 
any official or agent of a public international organisation.’”). 
 84  See Koehler, supra note 7, at 971–77 (detailing a long list of questionable applications 
of this phrase and arguing that “[d]espite Kay’s [United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 740 
(5th Cir. 2004)] equivocal holding, there has since been an explosion in FCPA enforcement 
actions where the improper payments are alleged not to obtain or retain any particular 
business, but rather, involve customs duties and tax payments, or payments alleged to have 
assisted the payer in securing foreign government licenses, permits, and certifications.”); 
Westbrook, supra note 2, at 540–41 (same).  To take one example, the Dow Chemical 
settlement alleged payments through a fifth tier subsidiary, to Indian government officials to 
register several agro-chemical products slated for marketing in time for India’s growing 
season.  Complaint ¶ 2, SEC v. Dow Chemical Co., No. 07-CV-336 (D.D.C. 2007), 
available at http://fcpa.shearman.com/?s=matter&mode=form&id=133. 
 85  See SEC Sues the Titan Corporation for Payments to Election Campaign of Benin 
President, Litigation Release No. 19107, 2005 WL 474238 (Mar. 1, 2005).  Other cases have 
involved fairly underwhelming sums at issue.  The Westinghouse settlement, for example, 
included an allegation of twelve monthly payments of $31.50 to India’s Central Board of 
Excise and Customs.  Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Westinghouse Air Brake Technologies 
Corporation Agrees to Pay $300,000 Penalty to Resolve Foreign Bribery Violations in India 
(Feb. 14, 2008), 
http://fcpa.shearman.com/files/540/5405cace013845d322fad7e7ff94c379.pdf?i=a0512bf121
5d0370409344896331a3e4; Shearman & Sterling LLP, U.S. v. Westinghouse Air Brake 
Technologies Corporation, FCPA.SHEARMAN.COM, 
http://fcpa.shearman.com/?s=matter&mode=form&id=93 (last visited Jan. 1, 2013). 
 86  See Kenneth Winer & Gregory Husisian, The ‘Knowledge’ Requirement of the FCPA 
Anti-Bribery Provisions: Effectuating or Frustrating Congressional Intent?, WHITE- COLLAR 
CRIME REP., Oct. 2009, at 3, available at http://www.foley.com/files/Publication/a1d4aa39-
1324-4018-bd8a-1cbddfc15e02/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/7e8b814e-446b-411d-
8722-1e747b29b303/FCPAWinerHusisian2009.pdf (“The DOJ and SEC . . . now interpret 
the knowledge requirement so broadly that they have effectively eviscerated the 1988 
statutory changes.”). 
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companies of subsidiaries that violate the books-and-records provisions.
87
 
The Enforcement Agencies’ recent actions and public statements 
indicate an intent to institutionalize FCPA enforcement on a permanent 
basis at its current or even greater levels of activity.  The new, 
institutionalized phase of FCPA enforcement is epitomized by DOJ 
Director Breuer’s statement that “FCPA enforcement is stronger than it’s 
ever been—and getting stronger . . . . We are in the new era of FCPA 
enforcement; and we are here to stay.”88  Accordingly, the DOJ is 
committing more resources to FCPA enforcement, including a new Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) unit consisting of eight full-time, dedicated 
FBI investigators.
89
  The SEC has followed suit.  In August 2009, an SEC 
reorganization created a specialized unit tasked only with FCPA 
prosecutions,
90
 which SEC Division of Enforcement Director Robert 
Khuzami announced would “focus on new and proactive approaches to 
identifying violations.”91 
Finally, international attention on anti-bribery enforcement, while 
initially non-existent, gained momentum in the mid-1990s.  The surge in 
international anti-bribery activity was principally manifested in the signing 
of new multilateral agreements and the enactment of domestic legislation 
prohibiting transnational bribery.  In 1996, the Organization of American 
States adopted the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption,
92
 with 
the OECD Convention following in 1997.  And in 2003, the flurry of 
international anti-bribery agreements continued with the signing of the 
UNCAC
93
 and the African Union’s Convention on Preventing and 
Combating Corruption,94 both modeled around the FCPA and OECD 
Convention.
95
  Important recent developments include the passage of the 
 
 87  See Koehler, supra note 7, at 977–81; Westbrook, supra note 2, at 548; Shearman & 
Sterling LLP, SEC v. Nature’s Sunshine Products Inc., Douglas Faggioloi, and Craig D. 
Huff, FCPA.SHEARMAN.COM, http://fcpa.shearman.com/?mode=form&id=230 (last visited 
Mar. 8, 2013). 
 88  See Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice, Remarks at the 24th 
National Conference on the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Nov. 16, 2010) (transcript 
available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/pr/speeches/2010/crm-speech-101116.html). 
 89  See Westbrook, supra note 2, at 559. 
 90  See Robert Khuzami, Dir., Div. of Enforcement, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks 
Before the New York City Bar: My First 100 Days as Director of Enforcement (Aug. 5, 
2009) (transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2009/spch080509rk.htm). 
 91  Id. 
 92  Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, Mar. 29, 1996, S. Treaty Doc. No. 
105-39 (entered into force in the United States Oct. 29, 2000). 
 93 G.A. Res. 58/4, supra note 11. 
 94  African Union, Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption art. 4, July 11, 
2003, 43 I.L.M. 5. 
 95  See DEMING, supra note 23, at 115–16 (“[M]any of the concepts and measures 
reflected in the OECD Convention . . . have been incorporated into the U.N. Convention.”); 
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2010 U.K. Bribery Act
96
 and amendments to China’s criminal code in 2011, 
which added a provision prohibiting bribery of foreign officials.
97
 
2.  Explaining Recent Trends 
What is the explanation for the tremendous surge in anti-bribery 
enforcement in the United States and, to a somewhat lesser extent, 
internationally? It is important to venture an explanation, because 
understanding why enforcement has increased in recent years casts light on 
the role disgorgement has played in the process and on how altering 
disgorgement rules may affect the behavior of the parties involved.  There 
are a number of competing but in some ways complementary hypotheses, 
none of which can conclusively be considered the one underlying cause.
98
 
The first narrative is that, beginning in the 1990s, various interested 
parties gained a new appreciation for the harm caused by corporate 
bribery.
99
  Developing countries with high levels of bribery, once thought to 
simply have a different commercial culture, began to lobby on their own 
behalf for stricter international anti-bribery enforcement, making claims 
about the “cultural imperialism” of foreign anti-bribery efforts lose 
credibility.
100
  “Values” groups committed to the idea that bribery is wrong 
in and of itself—Transparency International (TI) being the most 
prominent—organized and became effective lobbyists at the international 
and domestic levels.
101
  Finally, a series of bribery scandals in Europe 
 
Westbrook, supra note 2, at 512 (noting that the U.N. and African Union treaties contain 
provisions similar to those of the FCPA). 
 96  See Bribery Act 2010—An Introduction, PWC, http://www.pwc.co.uk/forensic-
services/issues/bribery-act-2010-an-introduction.jhtml (last visited Feb. 16, 2013). 
 97  See Darryl S. Lew, China’s New Anti-Corruption Law Goes into Effect May 1, 2011, 





 98  This Part discusses leading theories, but is not necessarily exhaustive.  Perhaps the 
most modest, default explanation is that the FCPA trend is simply a subset of the more 
general increase in federal, white collar, and global criminal law enforcement.  See Ellen S. 
Podger, Globalization and the Federal Prosecution of White Collar Crime, 34 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 325 (1997). 
 99  See generally Abbott & Snidal, supra note 5. 
 100 See id. at S159 (“Beginning in the 1980s, however, some development experts, as well 
as officials and NGOs in developing countries, began to change their views . . . .  A turning 
point was the World Bank’s 1989 Africa Long Term Perspectives Study, in which 
development experts called for a rethinking of policy.  A few years later, Southern 
development groups ‘hijacked’ an OECD conference, demanding action against corruption 
at an event designed to divert calls for change.”); Tarullo, supra note 12. 
 101 See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 5, at S165–66.  The normative case for anti-bribery 
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roused public sentiment and framed bribery as a problem afflicting the 
developed world as well, making agreement to the 1997 OECD Convention 
possible.
102
  In sum, enforcement has arguably increased because of the 
increased awareness of bribery as a problem. 
A second line of argument focuses on the rational self-interest of 
individuals and organizations involved in anti-bribery enforcement, rather 
than changes in preferences or values.  As previously noted, the 
Enforcement Agencies have used inventive legal theories to stretch the 
jurisdictional bounds of the FCPA to its limits to target foreign companies 
instead of domestic ones.
103
  This prosecutorial strategy flips the collective 
action problem raised by the OECD Convention on its head.
104
  Not only 
does enforcement generate positive revenue for the U.S. government, it also 
advantages domestic U.S. corporations that are less heavily investigated or 
punished relative to their foreign competitors.
105
  A state-based explanation 
is buttressed by a public choice analysis at the intra-state level, which 
shows that public officials within the Executive Branch can use 
“enthusiastic enforcement” as a means for agency aggrandizement and 




enforcement was also bolstered by a shift in the economic literature, which began to coalesce 
around the conclusion that bribery had economically and politically corrosive effects, rather 
than representing a socially efficient method for circumventing dysfunctional legal systems.  
See infra note 208–12 and accompanying paragraph. 
 102 See S. EXEC. REP. NO. 105-19, at 55 (1998) (noting the prominence of then-recent 
European bribery scandals in building support for the treaty). 
 103 A recent statistical study finds that monetary penalties against foreign companies 
exceed those levied on U.S. companies, even when controlling for other relevant factors such 
as the size of the bribe.  Stephen J. Choi & Kevin E. Davis, Foreign Affairs and Enforcement 
of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 24–25 (N.Y. Univ. Law & Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 12-15, 2012), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2116487.  Nine of the ten largest FCPA 
penalties have been imposed on non-U.S. corporations.  Berger et al., supra note 81.  Every 
investigation initiated in 2010 was against a foreign corporation.  See Cases and Review 
Releases, supra note 79. 
 104 Commentators have noted that the OECD Convention threatens to create a collective 
action problem for member states: reduced bribery in international markets is a non-
excludable global public good that makes foreign markets more profitable for any state 
capable of competing in them, and therefore rational states should be expected to under-
invest in its provision.  See SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT: 
CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND REFORM (1999); Tarullo, supra note 12, at 681–83 (arguing 
that the OECD Convention locks its members in a multi-player prisoner’s dilemma); See also 
infra Part IV.B.i. 
 105 But see Davis, supra note 12, at 13–20 (suggesting that a rational state may in some 
cases unilaterally prosecute foreign bribery of its own nationals by selectively targeting only 
those forms of bribery—which he refers to as “superfluous bribes”—that waste corporate 
resources and fail a cost-benefit analysis). 
 106 See infra Part III. 
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A third explanation combines elements of the previous two and 
focuses on the connection between the rise of FCPA enforcement and the 
passage of SOX in 2002.
107
  SOX came in the wake of the Enron and 
WorldCom accounting scandals, and like the FCPA, was itself a response to 
increasing public concern over corporate malfeasance.
108
  SOX’s 
requirements for more transparent corporate accounting provide fertile 
ground for uncovering books-and-records violations of the FCPA.
109
  In 
addition, the substantial increase in SEC funding and staffing that SOX 
demanded has provided the SEC with the resources to more actively 
enforce other statutes under its mandate.
110
  The idea that SOX was a 
tipping point for FCPA enforcement complements the theories mentioned 
above: it represents both an increased awareness and concern over the issue 
of white collar crime, as well as a means for agency aggrandizement and 
rent-seeking by various private and public actors.
111
 
The proposals concerning disgorgement practices presented in this 
Article are closely related to the overlapping explanations of increasing 
FCPA enforcement outlined above.  If part of the rise in enforcement is a 
result of rent-seekers using large FCPA penalties to construct a mini-
industry within the Executive Branch, then reducing the “profitability” of 
this industry by removing disgorgement revenue will reduce the 
Enforcement Agencies’ incentive to resort to questionable prosecutorial 
tactics and overzealous investigations that disregard rule-of-law values and 
pose a threat of over-deterrence.  If, at the same time, a factor behind the 
upward trend in enforcement is an increased awareness of the problem of 
foreign bribery, then it is important to develop an alternative policy that 
allocates disgorgement funds in a way that makes anti-bribery efforts more 
effective.  This Article’s proposal seeks to address both these issues 
simultaneously. 
 
 107 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 308, 15 U.S.C. § 7246 (2011). 
 108 While only loosely related to accounting fraud or structural issues of corporate 
governance, a renewed call for prosecution of U.S. companies engaging in bribery overseas 
arguably taps into the same general mood animating the passage of SOX, as well as the 
broader trend of federalization and expansion of the prosecution of white collar crime. See 
generally Dan M. Kahan, Reallocating Interpretive Criminal-lawmaking Power Within the 
Executive Branch, 61 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 47 (1998); Podger, supra note 98. 
 109 See 18 U.S.C. § 1350 (2011) (providing SOX’s heightened reporting requirements); 
Westbrook, supra note 2, at 515–16; Yockey, supra note 9, at 794 (“[SOX] prompted an 
increasing number of firms to voluntarily disclose potential FCPA violations, which are 
considered ‘material’ events under SOX.”); Laura E. Kress, Note, How the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act Has Knocked the “SOX” Off the DOJ and SEC and Kept the FCPA on Its Feet, 10 U. 
PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 2, 3–5 (2009). 
 110 See Bixby, supra note 2, at 104. 
 111 See Frank Easterbrook, When Does Competition Improve Regulation?, 52 EMORY L.J. 
1297, 1305 (2003) (suggesting that the passage of SOX itself was an exercise in rent-seeking 
by the accounting industry). 
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III. CORRECTING FOR OVER-ENFORCEMENT: DIVERTING 
DISGORGEMENT REVENUE FROM THE SEC 
A leading source of inefficiency in current efforts to address 
transnational bribery is over-enforcement of the FCPA, or more precisely, 
enforcement of the statute in an unbalanced manner that is deleterious to 
rule-of-law values and economic growth.
112
  Subpart A provides a public 
choice analysis of FCPA enforcement and explains how rent-seeking 
behavior by government officials and private lawyers contributes to over-
zealous enforcement.  Subpart B identifies how the rent-seeking dynamic 
and its attendant over-enforcement lead to bad outcomes, including 
arbitrary and disproportionate penalties, prosecutorial tactics that are 
inconsistent with rule-of-law values, and deterrence of otherwise desirable 
foreign investment.  Subpart C argues that this Article’s proposed policy of 
transferring the SEC’s disgorgement revenue from the U.S. Treasury to 
third parties would reduce the pathologies of the current enforcement 
regime. 
A. Agency Costs and Rent Seeking in FCPA Enforcement 
“Rent-seeking” is an economic concept from the public choice 
literature,
113
 most commonly referring to private efforts to produce public 
interventions that allow for monopoly or non-competitive profits.
114
  But the 
term has also been adapted to describe public officials’ use of the 
government’s monopoly over law enforcement to appropriate private 
gains.
115
  The FCPA enforcement regime in its present form creates 
 
 112 See supra note 7. 
 113 Public choice theory applies economic principles to the political process.  That is to 
say, a public choice analysis proceeds from the economic assumption that private actors 
maximize self-interest, and applies this assumption to individuals working in the public 
sector.  See generally GORDON TULLOCK & JAMES BUCHANAN, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: 
LOGICAL FOUNDATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962); Gary S. Becker, A Theory 
of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q. J. ECON. 371 (1983); 
Joseph P. Kalt & Mark A. Zupan, Capture and Ideology in the Economic Theory of Politics, 
74 AM. ECON. REV. 279, 279 (1984) (“[Public choice] long ago put public interest theories of 
politics to rest.  These theories have correctly been viewed as normative wishing rather than 
explanations of real-world phenomena.  They have been replaced by models of political 
behavior that are consistent with the rest of microeconomics.”). 
 114 See Anne O. Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, 64 AM. 
ECON. REV. 291 (1974) (providing the first use of the term “rent-seeking”); Gordon Tullock, 
The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W. ECON. J. 224 (1967) (providing an 
early seminal treatment of the dynamics that came to be known as rent-seeking). 
 115 See Nuno Garoupa & Daniel Klerman, Optimal Law Enforcement with a Rent-Seeking 
Government, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 116, 117 (2002) (“We . . . analyz[e] a government 
motivated partially or entirely by rent seeking.  This view of the government is quite 
common in public choice scholarship.  A rent-seeking government designs enforcement and 
punishment with the goal of appropriating the rents of the criminal market.”); see also Gary 
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incentives for public officials to opportunistically push for ever-greater 
enforcement at several levels of the federal government hierarchy.  As a 
result, the enforcement policies currently pursued involve a substantial 
amount of rent-seeking by public officials and private lawyers. 
Recognizing that public officials are not purely motivated by public 
interest
116
 means that “agency costs” exist when there is a conflict between 
private interests of public officials and the public interest.
117
  Econometric 
studies, as well as legal scholarship relying on a more anecdotal approach, 
both conclude that agency costs lead to rent-seeking in public law 
enforcement and lead prosecutorial decision-making away from the social 
optimum.
118
  Bureaucracies as a whole have also been modeled with self-




In pursuing FCPA violations, the Enforcement Agencies are far from 
 
S. Becker & George J. Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of 
Enforcers, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1974); David Friedman, Why Not Hang Them All: The 
Virtues of Inefficient Punishment, 107 J. POL. ECON. S259 (1999); Keith N. Hylton & 
Vikramaditya Khanna, A Public Choice Theory of Criminal Procedure, 15 SUPREME CT. 
ECON. REV. 61 (2007). 
 116 A public choice analysis remains relevant even when the preferences of public actors 
are often public-regarding.  See Geoffrey Brennan & James Buchanan, The Normative 
Purpose of Economic ‘Science’: Rediscovery of an Eighteenth Century Method, 1 INT’L REV. 
L. & ECON. 155, 160 (1981) (“[T]he only assumption required . . . is the assumption that 
some individuals behave in their narrowly defined private interest at least some of the 
time.”). 
 117 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial 
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308 (1976) (“[I]t is 
generally impossible for the principal or the agent at zero cost to ensure that the agent will 
make optimal decisions from the principal’s viewpoint.  In most agency relationships the 
principal and the agent will incur positive monitoring and bonding costs (non-pecuniary as 
well as pecuniary), and in addition there will be some divergence between the agent’s 
decisions and those decisions which would maximize the welfare of the principal.”). 
 118 See, e.g., Richard T. Boylan, What Do Prosecutors Maximize? Evidence from the 
Careers of U.S. Attorneys, 7 AM. L. ECON. REV. 379 (2005) (using an econometric model to 
argue that career-motivated DOJ attorneys try to maximize the sentencing length in the cases 
they bring); Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 289 (1983); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979, 
1987 (1992) (providing a legalistic account: “The real parties in interest (the public and the 
defendant) are represented by agents (the prosecutor and the defense attorney) whose goals 
are far from congruent with those of their principals.  There is, accordingly, a potential for 
conflicts of interest or, in the language of economics, a problem of agency costs”); Edward 
L. Glaeser, Daniel P. Kessler, & Anne Morrison Piehl, What Do Prosecutors Maximize? An 
Analysis of Drug Offenders and Concurrent Jurisdiction (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 6602, 1998) (providing an econometric analysis showing that federal 
prosecutors’ private incentive to use cases as a vehicle for human capital development 
causes a disproportionate number of dangerous criminals to be held in state prisons less 
equipped to deal with them than federal prisons). 
 119 See DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III 362–68 (2002). 
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immune to agency costs.  Like all law enforcement officials, DOJ and SEC 
attorneys gain a reputation for efficacy by bringing actions and obtaining 
large corporate settlements.
120
  In addition, attorneys and accountants in the 
Enforcement Agencies are in a position to create a demand for legal and 
accounting services which they are uniquely positioned to supply upon 
leaving the government and joining private firms,
121
 contributing to what 
has been called a “cottage industry” of FCPA experts.122  Corporations 
charged with white collar offenses now routinely engage outside counsel to 
perform elaborate and costly internal investigations,
123
 effectively using 
these firms as “branch office[s] of the prosecutor.”124  The increasing 
tendency to resort to settlements with non-prosecution agreements, the 
waiver of attorney-client privilege, the installation of corporate monitors, 
and the emphasis on corporate cooperation in investigations are all 




Enforcement Agency attorneys can and do take advantage of this 
“revolving door” with private law firms.126  Mark Mendelsohn, head of the 
 
 120 See id. 
 121 See Vardi, supra note 7 (quoting Joseph Covington, head of white collar defense at 
Jenner & Block: “This is good business for law firms . . . and Justice Department lawyers 
who create the marketplace and then get yourself a job.”). 
 122 Yockey, supra note 9, at 793 (“[T]he rise in FCPA enforcement has produced a 
cottage industry of FCPA experts, including lawyers, accountants, and consultants at 
prestigious firms, which DOJ and SEC personnel often join after leaving their federal jobs 
for considerably higher compensation.”). 
 123 Debevoise and Deloitte’s internal investigation of Siemens reportedly generated fees 
of $850 million, while Skadden Arps’ investigation of Daimler cost at least $500 million. 
Vardi, supra note 7. 
 124  See generally Harry First, Branch Office of the Prosecutor: The New Role of the 
Corporation in Business Crime Prosecutions, 89 N.C.L. REV. 23 (2011); David S. 
Hilzenrath, Justice Department, SEC Investigations Often Rely on Companies’ Internal 
Probes, WASH. POST., May 22, 2011.  This is not to say that encouraging internal 
investigations is unwise from a public policy perspective.  See Jennifer Arlen & Reinier 
Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: an Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 
72 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 687 (1997) (discussing how incentivizing companies to monitor, 
investigate, and report employee wrongdoing may be an efficient enforcement regime). 
 125 See First, supra note 124, at 46–48.  The DOJ’s “Holder Memorandum” and 
“Thompson Memorandum” also provide detailed guidance for the forms of cooperation the 
agency expects and encourages from defendant corporations.  Memorandum from Eric 
Holder, Deputy Att’y Gen., to All Component Heads and United States Att’ys (June 16, 
1999) (on file with Dep’t of Justice); Memorandum from Larry Thompson, Deputy Att’y 
Gen., to All Component Heads and United States Att’ys (Jan. 20, 2003) (on file with Dep’t 
of Justice). 
 126 See generally Mike Koehler & Ethan S. Burger, Recent High-Level Department of 
Justice Departure Raises Recurring Questions that Require Prompt Action, ACJS TODAY, 
Dec. 2010, at 1 (discussing how more and more attorneys are leaving governmental positions 
where they enforced the law for private sector jobs where they defend clients against those 
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DOJ’s FCPA department during the rise in enforcement, left to join the law 
firm Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP for $2.5 million a year, 
an amount that the Wall Street Journal described as a “significant sum, 
particularly for a lawyer arriving at the firm without a ready list of 
clients.”127  Perhaps the most eyebrow-raising example occurred when 
William Jacobson, Assistant Chief at the DOJ in 2007 when oil company 
Weatherford International disclosed a bribery problem, left to become 
partner at Fulbright & Jaworski (the firm handling Weatherford’s internal 
investigation), and eventually became Weatherford’s general counsel in 
2008.
128
  Enforcement Agency officials also routinely leave government to 
consult as compliance monitors, a service costing one FCPA defendant a 
projected $52 million over four years.
129
  To be sure, the Enforcement 
Agencies have ethics rules designed to prevent conflicts of interest, such as 
a one-year “cooling-off” period for DOJ attorneys before they may appear 
before the DOJ representing defendants.
130
  But these rules serve only to 
prevent the most egregious conflict of interest scenarios, and do little to 
alter the fact that, to the extent that Enforcement Agency officials can 
maintain the FCPA’s trajectory as a “sizzling hot practice area,” their 
services will be in high demand among private firms.
131
 
FCPA enforcement also provides opportunities for rent-seeking at the 
bureaucracy and Executive Branch levels.  Recent initiatives by the SEC 
and DOJ to increase and entrench organizational resources dedicated to 
FCPA enforcement are consistent with public choice models of a personnel-
maximizing and/or budget-maximizing bureaucracy.
132
  Leaders in the 
Executive Branch also benefit by establishing popular “tough on corporate 
crime” bona fides133 as well as by tapping FCPA disgorgements and 
 
same laws).  The SEC also regularly experiences high-level departures to law and accounting 
firms, as reflected by the sixty-six former SEC employees who filed 168 letters in 2008–
2009 disclosing clients they planned to represent before the SEC.  Tom McGinty, Staffer 
One Day, Opponent the Next, WALL ST. J., Apr. 5, 2010, at C1. 
 127 Nathan Koppel, Top U.S. Bribery Prosecutor to Join Paul Weiss, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 
14, 2010), http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB10001424052702303695604575182174285804354.html. 
 128 Vardi, supra note 7, at 2. 
 129 Id.  As of 2010, seven of the thirteen FCPA monitors were former DOJ employees.  
Id. 
 130 See Koehler & Burger, supra note 126, at 4. 
 131 The DOJ stated that it had roughly 150 ongoing FCPA investigations at the end of 
2010.  Richard L. Cassin, The 2011 Watch List, FCPA BLOG (Dec. 29, 2010, 8:02 AM), 
http://www.fcpablog.com/blog/2010/12/29/the-2011-watch-list.html. 
 132 See MUELLER, supra note 119, at 362–68; supra notes 90–91 and accompanying text 
(citing remarks made by SEC officials about “institutionalizing” the SEC’s newly expanded 
enforcement apparatus). 
 133 White collar crime is subject to the same one-way ratchet as other areas of criminal 
law, in which it is popular with the electorate to continuously escalate penalties and to 
 Northwestern Journal of  
International Law & Business 33:325 (2013) 
352 
penalties as an important source of revenue.
134
 
Perhaps most importantly, Enforcement Agencies and Executive 
Branch leaders face an incentive to expand the FCPA’s jurisdictional reach 
in order to prosecute and collect revenue from non-U.S. corporations while 
leaving U.S. companies unscathed and at a competitive advantage.
135
  In 
fact, as discussed before, nine of the ten biggest FCPA settlements have 
been with foreign corporations.
136
  In 2010, ninety percent of the dollar 
value of FCPA fines and penalties were imposed on foreign corporations.137  
A recent study of FCPA penalties finds a statistically significant difference 
between monetary penalties imposed on foreign corporations compared to 
U.S. companies, even when controlling for the magnitude of the bribe and 
market capitalization of the defendant.
138
  These are confusing figures for a 
statute that purports to ensure the integrity of U.S. businesses.139 
To be clear, the Enforcement Agencies are not “self-funding” in the 
sense that they channel FCPA penalties directly into their budgets; fines are 
paid into the U.S. Treasury.  But there is plenty of evidence that the 
Enforcement Agencies use the magnitude of FCPA penalties to leverage 
increases in funding in a manner that fits the model of a budget- or 
personnel-maximizing bureaucracy.
140
  As the DOJ’s former Assistant 
Chief for FCPA enforcement recently admitted: “the government sees a 
profitable program, and it’s going to ride that horse until it can’t ride it 
anymore.”141  And in the DOJ Civil Division’s 2013 budget justification, 
 
cultivate a reputation as being “tough” on corporate crime.  See Kahan, supra note 108, at 
50.  This is especially true in a post-Enron and post-financial crisis era in which corporate 
corruption is perceived to be closely linked to negative movements in the business cycle.   
See, e.g., GEORGE AKERLOF & ROBERT SHILLER, ANIMAL SPIRITS: HOW HUMAN PSYCHOLOGY 
DRIVES THE ECONOMY, AND WHY IT MATTERS FOR GLOBAL CAPITALISM 26–41, 38 (2009) 
(“[T]he business cycle is connected to fluctuations in personal commitment to principles of 
good behavior and to fluctuations in predatory activity.”). 
 134 Cf. Terry M. Moe, The Positive Theory of Public Bureaucracy, in PERSPECTIVES ON 
PUBLIC CHOICE 455, 477–78 (Dennis C. Mueller ed., 1997) (highlighting the influence of 
presidential preferences in bureaucratic decision making from a theoretical perspective). 
 135 See supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
 136 Berger et al., supra note 81. 
 137 Mike Koehler, Big, Bold, and Bizarre: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enters a 
New Era, 43 U. TOL. L. REV. 99, 105 (2011). 
 138 See Choi & Davis, supra note 103, at 24. 
 139 The DOJ has stated: “Congress enacted the FCPA to bring a halt to the bribery of 
foreign officials and to restore public confidence in the integrity of the American business 
system.”  Lay Person’s Guide, supra note 25. 
 140 See Moe, supra note 134 (providing an overview of rational choice models of 
bureaucratic decision-making); WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE 
GOVERNMENT (1971). 
 141 See Joseph Rosenbloom, Here Come the Payoff Police, AM. LAW. (May 17, 2011), 
http://www.americanlawyer.com/PubArticleTAL.jsp?id=1202457704533&Here_Come_the_
Payoff_Police (quoting William Jacobson, former Assistant Chief at the DOJ). 
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the Division unselfconsciously declared itself the “profit center of the U.S. 
Treasury.”142  The SEC has also historically lobbied for and justified 
funding demands by reference to the amount of revenue it brings in.
143
  The 
frankness with which the Enforcement Agencies refer to themselves as 
“profit centers” mainly reflects the fact that use of the FCPA as a vehicle 
for rent-seeking is an open secret.  As Perlis and Chais pointed out: “While 
[several] causes have increased investigations, governments will keep 
pursuing corrupt business practices for one very simple reason—it’s 
lucrative.”144 
Lastly, and most simply, revenue collected through FCPA enforcement 
in general, and the disgorgement remedy in particular, is substantial: in 
2010, FCPA enforcement resulted in approximately $1.8 billion in 
combined corporate fines and penalties.
145
  In that same year, ninety-six 
 
 142 See CIVIL DIV., DEP’T OF JUST., FY 2013 BUDGET AND PERFORMANCE PLANS 23 
(2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/jmd/2013justification/pdf/fy13-civ-
justification.pdf (“Few profit centers can boast of a [comparable] return on 
investment . . . .”); CRIMINAL DIV., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2011 PRESIDENT’S BUDGET 20–22 
(2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/jmd/2011justification/pdf/fy11-crm-
justification.pdf (requesting more FCPA staff while noting that “the [Criminal] Division’s 
FCPA prosecutions have resulted in fines and penalties totaling more than $1 billion”). 
 143 See Oversight of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission’s Operations, 
Activities, Challenges, and FY 2012 Budget Request: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Capital Mkts., Ins. & Gov’t Sponsored Enters. of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 
51 (2011) (“It is important to note that the SEC’s FY 2012 funding request will be fully 
offset by matching collections of fees on securities transactions.”); , Hearing on the FY 2012 
Funding for the CFTC and SEC: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Servs. & Gen. Gov’t 
of the S. Comm. on Appropriations, 112th Cong. (2011) (statement of Mary Schapiro, 
Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n) (noting that “multi-million dollar [FCPA] 
settlements” were part of a FY 2010 in which “disgorgements are up 20 percent, while the 
amount of monetary penalties has almost tripled”); see also Joel Seligman, Self-Funding For 
the Securities and Exchange Commission, 28 NOVA. L. REV. 233, 241 (2004) (describing the 
SEC’s push during the 1990’s to align its budget more closely with its “revenue”); Cyrus 
Sanati, For S.E.C., Self-Financing Remains but a Dream, DEALBOOK (June 25, 2010, 6:56 
PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2010/06/25/for-s-e-c-self-financing-remains-but-a-dream/ 
(explaining the SEC’s partial success in obtaining “match funding” which would link the 
SEC budget to the amount of transaction fees the agency collects). 
 144 Michael F. Perlis & Wrenn E. Chais, Investigating the FCPA, FORBES (Dec. 8, 2009, 
1:06 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2009/12/08/foreign-corrupt-practices-act-opinions-
contributors-michael-perlis-wrenn-chais.html; see also Justice’s Bribery Racket, WALL ST. J. 
(Feb. 17, 2012), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203711104577199412696071528.html 
(“Justice may not mind these embarrassing [litigation] failures, considering the cash its 
prosecutions are bringing in. The government saw a $1.8 billion windfall in FCPA-related 
fines and penalties from Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission in 2010 and 
another $508.6 million in 2011.”); Mike Koehler, Is the FCPA a Government Cash Cow?, 
FCPA PROFESSOR (May 21, 2010), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/is-the-fcpa-a-government-
cash-cow (agreeing  with the logic of the Perlis & Chais quote). 
 145 See Koehler, supra note 137, at 100. 
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percent of the FCPA penalties levied by the SEC consisted of 
disgorgement,
146
 with disgorgement revenue approaching fifty percent of 
the entire operating budget of the SEC.147  These eyebrow raising figures, 
reinforced by the revolving door dynamic, create the impression that the 
FCPA enforcement regime is essentially functioning as a for-profit industry 
within the Executive Branch.
148
 
The FCPA is not an undesirable statute per se, and this Article will 
argue that deterring foreign bribery is a worthy and important public 
policy.
149
  However, it is a question of balance, and because agency costs 
are endemic to the current FCPA regime, government actors responsible for 
enforcing the FCPA face opportunities to realize private benefits from 
increasing enforcement efforts above the socially optimal level.
150
 
B.  Adverse Consequences of the Agency Cost Problem 
The rent-seeking dynamic described above, in which every member of 
the FCPA enforcement apparatus benefits from expanding FCPA 
enforcement, has had several harmful consequences.  The recent boom in 
enforcement has been characterized by aggressive and often unjustifiable 
statutory interpretations, lack of judicial review, and arbitrary and 
disproportionate penalties.  The SEC’s disgorgement policies are arguably 
the most prominent illustration of this dysfunction.  These haphazard and 
opportunistic enforcement practices have not only threatened procedural 
regularity and “rule of law” values, but have also resulted in over-
deterrence.  Corporations have pulled back on investments in areas where 
there is uncertainty over the scope and magnitude of potential FCPA 
penalties, thus foregoing otherwise legitimate and productive foreign 
 
 146 See Koehler, supra note 14. 
 147 The SEC’s enacted budget for 2010 was $1.114 billion, a year in which disgorgement 
revenue was $509 million.  See id. 
 148 The magnitude of penalties is even more striking when compared to levels from the 
recent past.  In 2000, there was one FCPA enforcement action (by the SEC) with a total fine 
amount of $300,000.  Koehler, supra note 137, at 104. 
 149 See infra Part IV.A. 
 150 See infra Part III.B. (providing economic and legal bases for the over-enforcement 
premise).  It is likely impossible to exactly specify the optimal level of FCPA enforcement 
on a global scale—taking into account supply- and demand-side enforcement by the United 
States, other OECD states, and Host countries—in any meaningful or rigorous way.  On the 
other hand, it is widely acknowledged in literature that the socially optimal level of 
corruption is above zero, and that therefore resources expended on completely eliminating 
bribery—foreign or domestic—may be wasteful from a social welfare perspective.  See 
Susan Rose-Ackerman, The Political Economy of Corruption, in CORRUPTION AND THE 
GLOBAL ECONOMY 31, 33 (Kimberly Anne-Elliot ed., 1997) (“In seeking realistic reform it is 
important to realize that, like all illegal activity, the efficient level of bribery is not zero.  
Bribery is costly to control.  Reforms must consider the marginal costs as well as the 
marginal benefits of anticorruption strategies.”). 
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investments.  In addition to harming investing corporations, over-deterrence 
can also function as a form of de facto “sanctions” that cut off developing 
economies’ access to foreign capital. 
1.  Rule of Law 
The Enforcement Agencies’ aggressive approach in recent years has 
been largely inconsistent with traditional “rule of law” values that 
emphasize the need to clearly define prohibited behavior, treat similar cases 
similarly, and apply a separation of powers structure in which different 
bodies define, administer, and review the law.
151
  A major source of this 
problem is the Enforcement Agencies’ interpretations of the FCPA, as 
investigations have pursued legal theories that push ambiguous portions of 
the statutory language to their breaking point.
152
  Enforcement Agency 
positions as to what the relevant jurisdictional and knowledge requirements 
are,
153
 who is considered a “foreign official” or “control person,”154 what 
constitutes a satisfactory compliance program,
155
 and which payments are 
considered a “bribe”156 are highly questionable or unclear at best.  The 
penalties assessed under these theories also appear arbitrary, as similar 
cases have produced substantially different results.
157
 
The SEC’s disgorgement practices provide a prominent example of the 
Enforcement Agencies’ weak statutory interpretations.  In particular, there 
is widespread criticism of the SEC requiring disgorgement in cases 
involving books-and-records violations
158
 where no underlying act of 
 
 151 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., “The Rule of Law” As a Concept in Constitutional 
Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7–8 (1997) (providing a similar, five-element definition 
that reflects the principles that “Rule of Law should allow people to plan their affairs with 
reasonable confidence that they can know in advance the legal consequences of various 
actions,” and “should guarantee against at least some types of official arbitrariness”). 
 152 See generally Koehler, supra note 7. 
 153 See Paul R. Berger, Erin W. Sheehy & Kenya K. Davis, Is That a Bribe?, 26 INT’L 
FIN. L. REV. 76 (2006); Ashe, supra note 7, at 2927–30. 
 154 See Koehler, supra note 7, at 977. 
 155 See Westbrook, supra note 2, at 489–99, 560–61; see generally Bruce Hinchey, 
Punishing the Penitent: Disproportionate Fines in Recent FCPA Enforcements and 
Suggested Improvements, 40 PUBL. CONT. L. J. 393 (2011). 
 156 See Berger, Sheehy & Davis, supra note 153.  The FCPA’s definition of a bribe as 
“anything of value” to “obtain or retain business” has not been conservatively applied.  See 
supra notes 84–85 and accompanying text. 
 157 See Koehler, supra note 7, at 984. 
 158 As of August 2011, there had been seventeen such cases since 2007, in which the SEC 
has collected over $123 million in disgorgement and prejudgment interest.  Berger et al., 
supra note 46, at 2.  See, for example, the ITT case, where no anti-bribery violations were 
charged, but final judgment was entered ordering ITT to pay “disgorgement of $1,041,112 
together with prejudgment interest thereon of $387,538.11” and a $250,000 civil penalty.  
SEC v. ITT Corp., No. 1:09-CV-00272, 2009 WL 330269, ¶ 1 (D.D.C. Feb. 11, 2009), 
 Northwestern Journal of  




  It is difficult to see a justification for this practice that 
is consistent with legal principles underlying disgorgement.
160
  Recall that 
disgorgement is an equitable remedy requiring a liable party to forfeit any 
ill-gotten gains from the actions giving rise to liability.
161
  But if no bribe 
has been charged, it is senseless—and more importantly, legally incorrect—
to claw-back profits from hypothetical transactions that have not been 
subject to any legal challenge.  Indeed, cases dealing with disgorgement 
under the securities laws reject the SEC’s approach in the FCPA context.162  
The case law also specifically disapproves of the use of disgorgement 
remedies as a punitive measure, which is its only conceivable function 
where no liability for illegal payments is asserted.
163
 
When disgorgement is imposed in cases in which anti-bribery charges 
are present, the practice still remains problematic—particularly considering 
the escalating size of disgorgement settlements—in part because of the 
inherent difficulty in calculating the amount of illicit profits.  The SEC’s 
transparency has been unimpressive on this point, as one commentator 
explains: “the SEC settlement announcements often describe the size of the 
bribe and the disgorgement from the violating company without mentioning 
the benefit that the company actually received from the bribe-perhaps 
because accurate calculation of such a benefit would be impossible.”164  The 
opacity of SEC disclosures does little to mask the inconsistency of 




Furthermore, regardless of the unique factual difficulties raised in the 
 
available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2009/comp20896.pdf. 
 159 See Koehler, supra note 7, at 983–85; Weiss, supra note 27, at 479; Recent Trends 
and Patterns in FCPA Enforcement, supra note 45, at 4. 
 160 See Weiss, supra note 27, at 492; Berger et al., supra note 46, at 3 (“In the context of 
a violation of the FCPA’s books and records or internal controls provisions, however, the 
required causal connection between the wrong and any alleged ill-gotten gain is inherently 
much more tenuous, if it can be said to exist at all.”); Recent Trends and Patterns in FCPA 
Enforcement, supra note 45, at 5. 
 161 See supra Part II.B. 
 162 See, e.g., SEC v. First City Fin. Corp. Ltd., 890 F.2d 1215, 1230–31 (D.D.C. 1989) 
(applying the 1934 Act). 
 163 See id.; Koehler, supra note 7, at 983. 
 164  Weiss, supra note 27, at 507 (citing SEC v. Titan Corp., No. 05-0411, 2005 WL 
474238, at *2 (D.D.C. Mar. 1, 2005)); SEC v. ABB Ltd., No. 1:04CV1141(RBW), 2004 WL 
1514888, at *3 (D.D.C. July 6, 2004). 
 165 See Sasha Kalb & Marc Alain Bohn, Disgorgement: The Devil You Don’t Know, 
CORPORATECOMPLIANCEINSIGHTS.COM (Apr. 12, 2010) 
http://www.corporatecomplianceinsights.com/disgorgement-fcpa-how-applied-calculated/ 
(“Establishing any reasonable measure of predictability when it comes to disgorgement, 
however, has proven challenging.”); see also Koehler, supra note 7, at 984–86 (comparing 
the Lucent and UTStarcom cases and concluding “same facts, different results”). 
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FCPA context, the SEC is currently applying an overly simplistic analytical 
framework that tends to produce incorrect and overestimated disgorgement 
amounts.  The SEC typically calibrates FCPA disgorgements by making a 
rough estimate of the “paper profits” from a particular project subject to 
bribery.
166
  A more rigorous methodology—and one typically used in 
analogous areas such as stock-drops related to securities fraud
167—would be 
to estimate the difference between the defendant corporation’s actual profit 
and the likely profit in a “but-for” world where no bribe was offered.168  
Such an analysis requires considering the “incremental probability of 
winning generated by the bribe and the opportunity cost of the project 
won,” both of which tend to produce a lower disgorgement number.169  
Thus, contrary to SEC practice, if a bribe generates less than 100% of the 
profit from a particular project, the entirety of the profit should not be 
considered an “ill-gotten gain.” 
Judicial review of the various enforcement strategies detailed above is 
rare.  Accordingly, there is a lack of relevant “FCPA case law” because 
cases are almost uniformly settled through out-of-court resolution vehicles 
such as non-prosecution agreements.
170
  The result is that disgorgement 
impositions that courts routinely reject in other contexts—as well as 




In addition to a limited body of judicial opinions interpreting the 
FCPA, administrative guidance has been minimal, further contributing to 
 
 166 See Kalb & Bohn, supra note 165. 
 167 Elaine Buckberg & Frederich C. Dunbar, Disgorgement: Punitive Demands and 
Remedial Offers, 63 BUS. LAW. 347, 352 (2008) (“[A]lthough few courts have discussed the 
concept of netting [finding the net but-for benefit] in the disgorgement context, the principle 
is routinely invoked to calculate damages for securities fraud and, logically, the same 
principle should apply to disgorgement.”). 
 168 Dr. Patrick Conroy & Dr. Graeme Hunter, Economic Analysis of Damages Under the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, NERA ECON. CONSULTING, May 5, 2011, at 5, 
http://www.nera.com/nera-files/PUB_Foreign_Corrupt_Practices_0511.pdf. 
 169 Id. at 1–2; see also Kevin E. Davis, Civil Remedies for Corruption in Government 
Contracting: Zero Tolerance Versus Proportional Liability 36–42 (N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law 
Inst. Int’l Law & Justice, Working Paper No. 2009/4, 2009), available at 
http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1184&context=nyu_lewp (providing an 
argument for further reducing penalties for bribery in proportion to the defendant 
corporation’s monitoring efforts and value added from follow-on investment in the 
underlying bribe-related project). 
 170 See Koehler, supra note 7, at 929–46 (describing the prevalence of non-prosecution 
agreements and deferred-prosecution agreements in FCPA settlements).  There is one 
exception to the pattern of FCPA cases decided outside of court: cases against individuals 
tend to end up in court much more often.  See, e.g., United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 740 
(5th Cir. 2004). 
 171 See Yockey, supra note 9, at 836. 
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the uncertainty over how the Act will be interpreted and enforced.
172
  The 
recently issued “FCPA Guidance” sought to fill this interpretive gap and 
had the potential to be a positive step towards clarifying the law.
173
  
However, the Guidance is primarily a catalogue of previous enforcement 
decisions that gave rise to the current confusion, rather than a clear 
articulation of how the Enforcement Agencies intend to approach 
interpretative grey areas going forward.
174
 
One clear constant, congruent with the rent-seeking model discussed 
above, arises out of all this procedural inconsistency and legal chaos: FCPA 




2.  Economic Harm 
The current state of FCPA enforcement does not simply offend well-
regarded procedural principles.
176
  It also results in a practical harm: over-
deterrence of foreign investment.  To be sure, the premise of the Act is to 
deter foreign investments facilitated by bribery, and such deterrence should 
not be regarded as dysfunctional.  However, overzealous application of the 
 
 172 Until November 2012, Enforcement Agency guidance was limited to the marginally-
helpful Opinion Procedure Release process.  See Doty, supra note 53, at 1233–42 (arguing 
that agency guidance was limited, especially compared to other statutory regimes); 
Westbrook, supra note 2, at 497, 566–74 (same). 
 173 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE CRIMINAL DIV. & U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N 
ENFORCEMENT DIV., supra note 9. 
 174 See Matt Kelly, FCPA Guidance Released, COMPLIANCE WEEK (Nov. 14, 2012), 
http://www.complianceweek.com/fcpa-guidance-released/article/268299/ (quoting attorney 
Erich Schwartz: “This voluminous Resource Guide is clearly a substantial effort to organize 
the government’s thinking on a variety of issues that are important in understanding how to 
comply with the FCPA. It is not, however, a clear roadmap for compliance . . . .  The guide 
largely avoids announcing new policy.”); Mike Koehler, Guidance Roundup, FCPA 
PROFESSOR (Nov. 16, 2012, 12:08 AM), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/guidance-roundup 
(reviewing reactions to the guidance and concluding that “the consensus . . . appears to be 
that the guidance offers little in terms of actual new substance and that FCPA reform issues 
remain. It appears that the only contrary publicly stated position is a press release from a 
variety of civil society organizations”). 
 175 See Koehler, supra note 137, at 99 (“[M]uch of the largeness of FCPA enforcement in 
2010 was the result of bold enforcement theories that seemingly conflict with congressional 
intent in enacting the FCPA . . . .  [E]nforcement in 2010 was more than just big and bold: it 
was also bizarre. Among other things, FCPA enforcement suffers from several inherent 
contradictions.”). 
 176 The negative practical consequences of procedural irregularities in applying the FCPA 
are important, as rule-of-law based critiques can often descend to aestheticism or nostalgia 
for the pre-administrative state.  See Fallon, supra note 151, at 2–3 (“[M]any invocations of 
the Rule of Law are smug or hortatory. . . .  [T]he modern American legal system departs 
significantly from the provisional account of the Rule of Law . . . and it is strongly arguable 
that no plausible legal system could avoid departing from it in some respects.”). 
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Act comes at a unjustifiable cost to U.S. corporations and the domestic 
economy, as well as foreign jurisdictions where bribery takes place, which 
are often developing countries.
177
 
Aggressive and haphazard enforcement of the FCPA has led to over-
deterrence of foreign investment, because corporations facing substantial 
uncertainty over when and how the statute applies will forego otherwise 
legitimate investments to avoid the risk of prosecution.
178
  A recent Dow 
Jones survey found that fifty-one percent of companies delayed, and 
fourteen percent cancelled, business ventures abroad due to uncertainty over 
FCPA enforcement.
179
  The U.S. Chamber of Commerce has also called for 
reform, arguing that the main problem for businesses is lack of clarity and 
certainty: “the solution to this problem is not to do away with the FCPA and 
permit American companies to engage in bribery alongside their foreign 
competitors. Rather, the FCPA should be modified to make clear what is 
and what is not a violation.”180 
Added to the cost of foregoing international business opportunities are 
monitoring and internal compliance costs, which may tip the balance of 
profitable investment projects from positive to negative,
181
 and may also 
create an environment where “agents and employees will become overly 
risk-averse and thus deterred from taking actions that would otherwise 
benefit their firms.”182  Finally, empirical studies generally show that the 
 
 177 See Dalton, supra note 5, at 615–16 (“Between 2003 and 2004 alone, the United 
States exported $392.6 billion in foreign direct investment worldwide . . . .  Even if efficient 
conduct proscribed under the Act is only a small percentage of foreign investment, given the 
considerable degree of investment being outwardly exported to foreign countries, the price 
imposed by the over-inclusive Act may be significant.”). 
 178 Weiss, supra note 27, at 505 (citing George Bittlingmayer, Regulatory Uncertainty 
and Investment: Evidence from Antitrust Enforcement, 20 CATO J. 295, 320–22 (2001)) 
(“Regulatory uncertainty has been quantitatively shown to be particularly harmful to 
investment in other contexts—for example, antitrust—and, while no quantitative study is 
available for foreign bribery, the likely result is similarly undesirable.”); Yockey, supra note 
9, at 824–25; see also John Bray, International Business Attitudes Toward Corruption, in 
GLOBAL CORRUPTION REPORT 316, 316 (2004). 
 179 See Westbrook, supra note 2, at 498; Yockey, supra note 9, at 824. 
 180 Weissmann & Smith, supra note 7, at 6. 
 181 See Miriam Baer, Insuring Corporate Crime, 83 IND. L.J. 1035, 1036 (2008) 
(“Because the current corporate criminal liability standard is so broad and the collateral 
consequences of a criminal indictment are so devastating, entities will attempt to avoid 
formal charges ex ante by investing in ‘compliance’ products intended to impress 
prosecutors in the future, even if these programs are more costly than effective.  Risk averse 
corporate managers may further attempt to avoid entity-based criminal liability by declining 
beneficial investments simply because they seem too risky.”); Koehler, supra note 7, at 1001 
(“The facade of FCPA enforcement also contributes to overcompliance by prompting risk-
averse companies to reflexively launch expensive and time-consuming internal 
investigations when the alleged conduct at issue may not even violate the FCPA.”). 
 182 Baer, supra note 181, at 1036; Yockey, supra note 9, at 824. 
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FCPA diverts investment from countries with endemic corruption,
183
 but 
endemic corruption is present in a large swath of the global economy.
184
  
Clearer guidance along with more consistent and proportionate penalties 
could facilitate some degree of legitimate investment in these countries.
185
 
The over-deterrence of foreign investment that follows from 
aggressive enforcement of the FCPA also deprives foreign jurisdictions—
often low income or developing countries—of valuable foreign capital.  
FCPA scholar Andrew Spalding has argued that overly broad enforcement 
of the FCPA functions a form of de facto “sanctions” against emerging 
economies.
186
  The sanctions argument follows from the above-mentioned 
empirical research showing that FCPA enforcement results in the 
withdrawal of foreign direct investment (FDI) from high-corruption 
developing economies.
187
  The harm caused by the withdrawal of foreign 
capital is compounded by the fact that it also changes the composition of 
FDI in emerging economies, with “corrupt countries receiv[ing] less of their 
FDI from less-corrupt countries and more of their FDI from more-corrupt 
countries.”188 
The perverse incentives that encourage government officials to 
 
 183 See Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra, The Effectiveness of Laws Against Bribery Abroad, 39 J. 
INT’L BUS. STUD. 634 (2008); Spalding, supra note 7, at 372–73; Anna D’Souza, The OECD 
Anti-Bribery Convention: Changing the Currents of Trade 3 (Cal. Ctr. for Population 
Research, Working Paper Series No. 2009-06, 2009), available at 
http://escholarship.org/uc/item/1m87n6hm. 
 184 Weissman & Smith, supra note 7, at 6 (“The statute should take into account the 
realities that confront businesses that operate in countries with endemic corruption (e.g., 
Russia, which is consistently ranked by Transparency International as among the most 
corrupt in the world) or in countries where many companies are state-owned (e.g., China).”). 
 185 See Spalding, supra note 7, at 401–03 (“There are numerous reforms to the text and 
enforcement of antibribery legislation that would advance the policy of reducing bribery 
without scaring companies away from emerging markets. . . . Mo[st] fundamentally, we 
should reevaluate the underlying theories of liability by which the government holds 
corporations accountable for FCPA violations.”). 
 186 See generally id.; cf. Tyler Cowen, One of the Best Ways to Help Haiti: Modify FCPA, 
MARGINAL REVOLUTION (Mar. 15, 2010, 9:24 AM), 
http://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2010/03/one-of-the-best-ways-to-help-
haiti.html (“As it stands right now, U.S. businesses are unwilling to take on this legal risk 
and the result is similar to an embargo.  You can’t do business in Haiti without paying 
bribes.”). 
 187 Spalding, supra note 7, at 373–74. 
 188 See id. at 373 (citing Cuervo-Cazurra, supra note 183, at  635); Alvaro Cuervo-
Cazurra, Who Cares About Corruption?, 37 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 807, 807 (2006).  The 
substitution of high-corruption foreign capital for low-corruption capital is significant 
because FDI-exporting firms with a culture and history of unethical business practices can 
have the effect of locking in and normalizing corrupt business practices among firms and 
government officials in the Host country receiving the FDI.  See ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra 
note 104, at 99–102. 
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constantly ratchet-up FCPA enforcement are probably not the sole cause of 
the procedural problems and harmful consequences described in this 
subpart.  But it is difficult to see how they are not a significant contributing 
factor.  Executive Branch officials who benefit from more enforcement are 
expected to pursue investigations pursuant to both strong and weak legal 
theories, to invite ambiguity into the statute rather than remove it, to target 
foreign corporations that are at best tangentially subject to the statute’s 
jurisdiction, to pursue the largest penalties possible, and to over-estimate 
corporate profits for purposes of disgorgement.
189
  Such practices will lead 
to an over-deterrence of otherwise legitimate foreign investment and 
impose an unjustifiable cost upon businesses investing in developing 
countries. 
C.  Transferring Disgorgement Would Reduce Rent Seeking 
Diverting disgorgement revenue currently flowing into U.S. Treasury 
coffers via the SEC would alter the dysfunctional incentives embedded in 
the current enforcement regime and encourage more proportionate and 
consistent outcomes.  To the extent that FCPA enforcement abuses are a 
product of a public-private cottage industry springing up around the FCPA, 
making that industry less “profitable” will reduce the return on 
prosecutorial and bureaucratic overreach, therefore reducing “investment” 
in over-enforcement. 
The benefits of transferring disgorgement sums follow from a basic 
insight of microeconomics, as applied by the public choice literature.  All 
else equal, as available rents increase, investment in capturing those rents 
by rent-seekers increase as well.
190
  In other words, “as rents become a more 
important governmental objective, more resources are invested in detection 
and punishment [of crimes that produce rents].”191 
This Article’s proposal strikes at the converse of the relationship 
described above: when the supply of available rents is reduced, a reduction 
of investment in wasteful rent-seeking activities will follow.  This same 
connection has been identified by economic analyses of criminal procedure 
 
 189 Nothing less follows from a public choice analysis relying on the minimalist 
assumption that at least some individuals in the public sector place some weight on their 
private self-interest some of the time.  See Brennan & Buchanan, supra note 116, at 160. 
 190 In the related context of competition among private actors for a monopoly rent, 
investment in rent-seeking can be modeled mathematically as follows: I = [(n-1)/n2] * r(R), 
where I represents the investment of a risk-neutral rent-seeker; n, the number of rent-seekers; 
and R, available rents; the magnitude of r determines whether returns on rent-seeking 
investment are diminishing or increasing.  See MUELLER, supra note 119, at 336, 335–47 
(deriving this equation and providing extensions).  Note that the basic relationship between I 
and R remains unchanged over varying values of r: what is important is that I as a function 
of R is increasing.  See id. at 336. 
 191 See Garoupa & Klerman, supra note 115, at 128. 
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in the context of rent-seeking law enforcement.  Following an earlier 
analysis by David Friedman,
192
 Hylton and Khanna argue: 
[One] way to constrain the costs associated with abuses of 
prosecutorial or punishment authority is to put restrictions on the size 
of penalties or the process by which they are levied . . . .  [O]ur 
analysis suggests that penalty restrictions increase the cost of 




When dealing with the fining authority of government agencies 
investigating corporations, this analysis can be applied equally across 
penalties whether they are nominally labeled “civil” or “criminal.”194 
The framework outlined above may be somewhat abstract, but the 
analysis it represents is easily illustrated by reference to the literature 
concerning private expenditures on political influence, or campaign finance.  
When the wealth transferred from one group to another through legislation 
or other government action represents the pool of available rents, campaign 
contributions—whether legal or otherwise—can be understood as rent-
seeking investments by interest groups.
195
  Perhaps unsurprisingly then, 
empirical work in this area finds the same positive correlation between the 
investment in rent-seeking (amount of campaign contributions and 
lobbying) and available rents (roughly approximated as the size of 
government budgets).
196
  This relationship is robust across government 
entities, whether at the state or federal level.
197
 
The same basic dynamic applies to the FCPA.  Recall the discussion in 
Part III.A supra, including the Enforcement Agency official’s statement 
that when “the government sees a profitable program[,] . . . it’s going to 
 
 192 Friedman, supra note 115. 
 193 Hylton & Khanna, supra note 115, at 24–25. 
 194 See Friedman, supra note 115, at S263 (defending the choice to not distinguish 
between civil and criminal penalties when the two are functionally equivalent); Hylton & 
Khanna, supra note 115, at 116 (“The analysis here could be applied to other current topics, 
including the extension of criminal procedural protections to civil suits brought by 
government agencies.”). 
 195 See Fred S. McChesney, “Pay to Play” Politics Examined, with Lessons for 
Campaign-Finance Reform, 6 INDEP. REV. 345, 349 (2002) (describing “[t]he orthodox story 
[of] rent creation” as “referring to private-donor money as buying ‘access and influence for 
their interests,’ . . . where rent refers to returns obtained through the political process rather 
than through private-market exchanges”). 
 196 See Franklin G. Mixon, Jr. & James B. Wilkinson, Maintaining the Status Quo: 
Federal Government Budget Deficits and Defensive Rent-Seeking, 26 J. ECON. STUD. 5, 5 
(1999) (“Evidence from a Parks regression technique suggests that total rent-seeking is 
positively related to the amount of federal spending, as others have shown.”). 
 197 See John R. Lott, Jr., A Simple Explanation for Why Campaign Expenditures Are 
Increasing: The Government Is Getting Bigger, 43 J.L. & ECON. 359 (2000). 
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ride that horse until it can’t ride it anymore.”198  A straightforward 
implication of basic microeconomic principles predicts that reducing the 
profitability of the “FCPA horse” should result in the government riding it 
less often.  In other words, a reduction in the private return to government 
actors by withdrawing disgorgement revenue should deflate the so-called 
“FCPA racket” and have a natural tendency to rein in some of the more 
aggressive and unjustified enforcement practices described in Part III.B 
above. 
A reduction in available rents would tip the Executive Branch’s cost-
benefit analysis into net negative territory for legally “adventurous” cases 
because they are more costly to pursue.
199
  For example, the logic of two 
and a half-year sting operations in Africa—in which U.S. government 
operatives offer fictitious “bribes” to Host country officials—may be 
dimmed when the potential revenue at stake is drastically reduced.
200
  
Pursuing cases via expansive statutory interpretations and creative legal 
theories is also more costly than the pursuit of straightforward cases, 
because the former have a greater chance of being challenged with 
resource-intensive litigation in court and carry a lower probability of victory 
at trial, which in turn lowers settlement value.
201
  The Enforcement 
Agencies’ mixed litigation outcomes in 2011, where negative judicial 
scrutiny was previously unheard of, underline the increasing costliness to 
prosecutors of over-extending the Act.
202
  Removing disgorgement would 
also mean fewer SEC staff devoted to the FCPA in the long run,
203
 putting 
pressure on the agency to pursue the “lower-hanging fruit” of FCPA 
investigations that have clearer factual and legal bases. 
Withdrawal of disgorgement revenue from the SEC would of course 
 
 198 See Rosenbloom, supra note 141 (quoting William Jacobson, former Assistant Chief 
at the DOJ). 
 199 Of course, the standard caveat of economic analysis applies to this claim as well: an 
economic model will provide a prediction about a behavioral tendency and not a narrative, 
psychological claim about how enforcement officials literally calculate their self-interest. 
 200 See Berger et al., supra note 81, at 6–7 (describing the “SHOT Show” cases, in which 
FBI agents posed as representatives of Gabon’s Ministry of Defense). 
 201 Indeed, economic models of criminal enforcement predict that “mixed” governments 
that at least partially pursue self-interest along with the public interest are more likely to 
expand the set of acts defined as illegal.  See Garoupa & Klerman, supra note 115, at 118 
(“[I]f offenders have sufficient wealth, a rent-seeking government will define more acts as 
illegal.”). 
 202 See Koehler, supra note 76 (detailing the Enforcement Agencies’ setbacks in a variety 
of litigations as a result of increased judicial scrutiny in 2011). 
 203 The SEC has historically lobbied for and justified funding demands by referencing the 
amount of revenue it produces.  See Seligman, supra note 143 (describing the SEC’s push 
during the 1990’s to align its budget more closely with its “revenue”); Sanati, supra note 143 
(explaining the SEC’s partial success in obtaining “match funding,” which would link the 
SEC budget to the amount of transaction fees the agency collects). 
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have a significant, direct impact on the agency’s disgorgement practices.  If 
any disgorgement remedy imposed would thereafter be transferred to third 
parties outside of the U.S. government, most of the SEC’s abuses in 
imposing the remedy would cease to have any justification.  For one, it is 
difficult to imagine that the controversial and legally untenable practice of 
requiring disgorgement in cases with only books-and-records charges and 
no finding of underlying bribery would be in the agency’s interest once the 
government is no longer in a position to receive the proceeds from such 
settlements.
204
  Also, the incentive to inflate disgorgement amounts would 
be greatly reduced if any money collected would be transferred to third 
parties.  As a result, the SEC would be less likely to put forward 




This Part’s proposal and accompanying analysis works indirectly and 
on the margin, and does not purport to be a cure-all.  However, the 
disgorgement proposal is superior to other top-down reform measures 
considered at recent congressional hearings regarding the FCPA that seek to 
directly modify or constrain prosecutorial behavior.
206
  These alternative 
measures in no way reduce the benefits the U.S. government and its 
officials realize from over-enforcement, and would only channel 
investigative zeal down new and creative paths that are equally undesirable.  
Attempting to close particular legal “doors” available to prosecutors ignores 
the FCPA’s multi-faceted expansion over the past decade, which shows that 
the Act can be over-extended along any number of dimensions.
207
 
IV. CORRECTING FOR UNDER-ENFORCEMENT: ENCOURAGING 
 ANTI-CORRUPTION EFFORTS BY FOREIGN JURISDICTIONS 
Transnational commercial bribery is a serious problem that imposes 
real costs on U.S. corporations and the Host countries in which they 
 
 204 See supra note 160 and accompanying text; supra Part II. 
 205 See supra note 165 and accompanying text.  A reduction of total penalties imposed 
under the FCPA through reduced disgorgements would also have mitigated the “revolving 
door” issue discussed in Part III.A: as the costs of FCPA compliance for U.S. companies is 
reduced, the demand for lawyers and accountants in currently thriving FCPA compliance 
groups should be reduced in turn. 
 206 See supra note 13 and accompanying text (citing to hearing testimony from June, 
2011 recommending rephrasing statutory provisions concerning “foreign official” and 
“willfulness”); Weissmann & Smith, supra note 7, at 7 (suggesting various statutory 
modifications, including: “[1] adding a compliance defense; [2] limiting a company’s 
liability for the prior actions of a company it has acquired; [3] adding a ‘willfulness’ 
requirement for corporate criminal liability; [4] limiting a company’s liability for acts of a 
subsidiary; and [5] defining a ‘foreign official’ under the statute”). 
 207  See supra Part II.C.i. 





  This was not always recognized.  Initially, the social science 
literature contained mixed views on whether bribery was efficient, or 
instead a detriment to political and economic development.
209
  The current 
consensus, however, is that competition for the favors of bribe-takers 
dissipates social wealth more often than not, in a dynamic that applies to 
bribing entities just as much as the countries where bribes take place.  A 
micro-level analysis reveals that resources are wasted in markets where 
bribery takes place because of the transaction costs associated with secrecy 
and the distortions created by government officials who actively seek to 
broaden the market for bribes.
210
  Cross-country studies that take a macro-
level approach also indicate that endemic corruption impedes foreign 
investment, economic growth, and political development.
211
  The latter 
 
 208 See The Costs of Corruption, WORLD BANK (Apr. 8, 2004), 
http://go.worldbank.org/LJA29GHA80 (estimating that more than $1 trillion is paid in bribes 
each year, calculated using 2001–02 economic data, which “compares with an estimated size 
of the world economy at that time of just over US$30 trillion . . . and does not include 
embezzlement of public funds or theft of public assets”).  In 2002 the African Union 
estimated the direct and indirect costs of corruption at $148 billion, which at that time 
amounted to twenty-five percent of the continent’s GDP.  African Development Bank 
Group, Proceedings of the Regional Learning Workshop on Combating Corruption in Africa 
(Jan. 27–30, 2003) (on file with author).  There is, of course, considerable room to question 
how these numbers can be accurately measured and how to interpret their relationship to the 
actual economic cost imposed. 
 209 See SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL ORDER IN CHANGING SOCIETIES 69 (1968) 
(“In terms of economic growth, the only thing worse than a society with a rigid, over-
centralized, dishonest bureaucracy is one with a rigid, over-centralized, honest 
bureaucracy.”); Abbott & Snidal, supra note 5, at S158 (“Until recently, the dominant view 
was that some forms of corruption are necessary, even beneficial, aspects of 
development . . . . Corruption occurs because traditional norms are ineffective in dealing 
with the rise of new groups and behaviors, while more appropriate norms have yet to 
emerge.”); Pranab Bardhan, Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues, 35 J. ECON. 
LIT. 1320, 1322–24 (1997) (“Economists have shown that, in the second-best world when 
there are pre-existing policy induced distortions, additional distortions in the form of black-
marketeering, smuggling, etc., may actually improve welfare even when some resources 
have to be spent in such activities.”). 
 210 See MUELLER, supra note 119, at 334 (treating rent-seeking expenditures as a form of 
bribery and identifying three forms of wasteful expenditures the bribe entails: (1) 
expenditures of bribe-givers competing for government favors; (2) efforts of officials to 
obtain bribes; and (3) third party distortions induced by actions of bribe givers and takers); 
ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 104, at 12, 25; M.S. Alam, Some Economic Costs of 
Corruption in LDCs, 27 J. DEV. STUD. 89 (1990); Bardhan, supra note 209, at 1322–24 
(“One does not have to take a moralistic position on corruption to see that some of these 
arguments above in favor of the efficiency effects of corruption are fraught with general 
problems, even though in individual instances some redeeming features of corruption may be 
present.”); Andrei Schleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Corruption, 108 Q.J. ECON. 599, 611–15 
(1993) (“[T]he illegality of corruption and the need for secrecy make it much more 
distortionary and costly than its sister activity, taxation.”). 
 211 JOHANN GRAF LAMBSDORFF, THE INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS OF CORRUPTION AND 
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research finds some confirmation in the fact that developing countries 
themselves have been among groups most vocally clamoring for efforts to 
combat corruption.
212
  Thus, despite the critique of FCPA enforcement 
practices outlined in Part III, there remains a need to build robust and 
effective anti-corruption enforcement, rather than simply trying to curtail it. 
Slow progress in the international enforcement of transnational bribery 
is not due to legalistic shortcomings in the quality or number of legal 
instruments addressing the issue.  As discussed in Part II.B, anti-bribery 
treaties have proliferated over the past fifteen years, and the OECD 
Convention contains similar substantive provisions to those of the FCPA.
213
  
Nevertheless, the three “major conclusions” of Transparency International’s 
Progress Report 2011 on the enforcement of the OECD Convention were: 
(1) “there has been no progress since TI’s 2010 progress report in the 
number of countries with active enforcement”; (2) “the Convention has not 
yet reached the point at which the prohibition of foreign bribery is 
consistently enforced”; and (3) “reviews conducted by TI experts indicate 
that the principal cause of lagging enforcement is lack of political 
commitment by government leaders.”214 
As the TI report suggests in its allusion to political commitment, the 
problem of under-enforcement stems from two underlying political 
economy dynamics that affect the cost-benefit calculations of the actors 
involved: (1) Host countries have an incentive to free-ride off of U.S. 
investments in corruption control, and otherwise face high capacity 
constraints when dealing with the local, demand-side of corruption; and (2) 
compliance with the OECD Convention has not occurred because of the 
prisoner’s dilemma that makes collective enforcement by member states 
difficult to implement. 
This Part discusses the Article’s proposal to remedy these structural 
barriers to more robust enforcement of transnational anti-bribery measures.  
Subpart A describes the proposal to transfer disgorged profits to the Host 
 
REFORM 71–79, 100–07 (2007); NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH, CORRUPTION AND 
REFORM: LESSONS FROM AMERICA’S ECONOMIC HISTORY (Edward L. Glaeser & Claudia 
Goldin eds., 2008); Paolo Mauro, Corruption and Growth, 110 Q.J. ECON. 681 (1995); 
Mitchell Seligson, The Measurement and Impact of Corruption Victimization: Survey 
Evidence from Latin America, 34 WORLD DEV. 381 (2006); Shang-Jin Wei, How Taxing is 
Corruption on International Investors? 82 REV. ECON. & STAT. 1 (2000). 
 212 See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 5, at S159–S160; Inter-American Convention 
Against Corruption, supra note 92. 
 213 See supra notes 92 and accompanying paragraph (identifying anti-bribery treaties 
agreed to by the OECD, United Nations, Organization of American States, and African 
Union). 
 214 TRANSPARENCY INT’L, PROGRESS REPORT 2011: ENFORCEMENT OF THE OECD ANTI-
BRIBERY CONVENTION 5 (2011), available at 
http://files.transparency.org/content/download/102/411/file/2011_OECDreport_EN.pdf. 
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country where the bribe has taken place, conditional on the Host country’s 
assistance in the FCPA investigation.  Subpart B explains the 
recommendation to direct disgorged profits to the OECD Working Group 
when cooperation on the part of the Host country is not forthcoming.  While 
withholding disgorgement from the SEC should be expected to reduce the 
level of resources dedicated to enforcement by U.S. Enforcement 
Agencies,
215
 transferring the proceeds to these third parties can nonetheless 
make international anti-bribery efforts more effective overall and address 
the problem of under-enforcement. 
A.  Disgorgement to Host Countries 
Host countries play a critical role in transnational anti-bribery 
enforcement.  Obtaining their cooperation would therefore make 
enforcement considerably more effective.  While the vast majority of these 
states are parties to multiple and overlapping international conventions that 
require affirmative efforts to combat corruption,
216
 active enforcement 
assistance on the part of Host countries is not always forthcoming.
217
  The 
jurisdictions where bribery takes place often have developing economies 
and resource-constrained governments with a low capacity for policing 
corruption.
218
  Host countries may also rationally under-invest in bribery 
 
 215 See supra Part III.C. 
 216 The UNCAC, which includes 158 member states, requires member states to “develop 
and implement or maintain effective, coordinated anticorruption policies” and “afford one 
another the widest measure of mutual legal assistance in investigations, prosecutions and 
judicial proceedings in relation to the offences covered by [the] Convention.”  See G.A. Res. 
58/4, supra note 11, arts. 5, 46.  The Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, which 
covers thirty-four states in South, Central, and North America, places similar legal 
obligations on its members.  See Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, supra note 
92, art. III ¶¶ 9, 10 (“State Parties agree to . . . create, maintain and strengthen . . . oversight 
bodies with a view to implementing modern mechanisms for preventing, detecting, 
punishing and eradicating corrupt acts [and] [d]eterrents to the bribery of domestic and 
foreign government officials.”); id. art. VIII (requiring prohibition and punishment of 
transnational bribery); id. art. XIV (requiring mutual assistance and cooperation among 
members).  The African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, which 
includes forty-three African countries, contains similar provisions.  See African Union, supra 
note 94, art. 7 (committing members to disciplining and investigating acts of corruption by 
public officials); id. art. 18 (“Parties shall provide each other with the greatest possible 
technical cooperation and assistance . . . to prevent, detect, investigate and punish acts of 
corruption.”). 
 217 In TI’s 2011 review of 183 countries, the vast majority of which have been party to 
the UNCAC for nearly a decade, sixty countries were rated “highly corrupt” and an 
additional forty-three were rated “corrupt.”  See TRANSPARENCY INT’L, CORRUPTION 
PERCEPTIONS INDEX 2011 (2011), available at 
http://files.transparency.org/content/download/101/407/file/2011_CPI_EN.pdf. 
 218 According to TI’s 2011 Corruption Perceptions Index, the world’s ten most corrupt 
states, in order of increasing corruption (ranking from 172–82 out of 182) are: Venezuela, 
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enforcement by free-riding off of U.S. and other advanced economies’ 
efforts to control the supply-side of bribes. 
Conditionally transferring disgorgement to Host countries would 
enable FCPA investigations to more efficiently uncover the underlying 
wrongful acts by making Host countries stakeholders in the investigation 
with an incentive to see it through as successfully as possible.
219
  The 
revenue generated by disgorgements could also be a valuable source of 
funds for countries with otherwise limited resources and capacity to pursue 
corruption investigations, and contribute to restricting the demand-side of 
the corruption problem.  Conditioning the transfer of disgorgement revenue 
would not be a wholly novel policy approach, as the United States along 
with the international organizations in which it plays a leading role already 
condition fund transfers to foreign countries in other contexts.
220
  The 
strictness of conditionality could also be calibrated based on the importance 
of obtaining Host country cooperation weighed against the value of 
leveraging the OECD Working Group to increase the enforcement efforts of 
other capital exporting economies. 
1.  The Critical Role of Host Countries in Corruption Investigations 
Host countries play a critical role in corruption investigations and the 
deterrence of transnational bribery more generally.  They are responsible 
for policing the demand-side of bribe-making
221
 and are also well-
positioned to supply valuable information to parties investigating the supply 
of bribes in the Host jurisdiction.  FCPA investigations are costly endeavors 
that could greatly benefit from achieving more efficient access to 
information.
222
  The investigations require U.S. Enforcement Agencies, and 
the private law firms they enlist, to uncover secret payments that take place 
 
Haiti, Iraq, Sudan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, Myanmar, North Korea, and 
Somalia.  Id.  By one measure, these countries are ranked 71, 157, 116, 135, 84, 121, 156, 
151, n/a, and 172, respectively, in (purchasing power parity adjusted) gross domestic product 
per capita.  GDP Per Capita PPP: Country List, TRADING ECON., 
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/country-list/gdp-per-capita-ppp (last visited Jan. 4, 2013). 
 219 Conditionality is a crucial feature of this proposal, because it would give Host 
countries an incentive to cooperate in this investigation, rather than provide a windfall to 
jurisdictions where bribery takes place. 
 220 See infra notes 258–60 and accompanying text. 
 221 The FCPA and OECD Convention apply only to bribe-giving persons or entities, and 
do not impose penalties on public officials who are the recipients of bribes.  See G.A. Res. 
58/4, supra note 11, art. 5 (obligating member states to implement anti-corruption policies in 
their jurisdictions). 
 222 A portion of the cost is reflected in the millions of dollars in fees charged by private 
law firms that begin to conduct “internal investigations” of clients who have received 
inquiries from the Enforcement Agencies.  See First, supra note 124 (providing examples of 
multi-million dollar FCPA investigations). 
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in foreign jurisdictions, often coordinated among multiple actors.
223
 
Investigations are further complicated by the fact that the harm from 
bribery is an intangible market distortion without a discrete “victim” in the 
Host country, as might be the case for other forms of international business 
malfeasance, such as fraud or environmental harms.
224
  Finally, even when 
a payment is identified, whether it constitutes a “bribe” is a fact-intensive 
question that turns on the parties’ intentions and subsequent actions.225 
Host country assistance is valuable, because the characteristics of 
FCPA investigations described above put information at a premium, and 
Host countries are often situated as the lowest-cost providers of relevant 
information.
226
  FCPA violations by definition involve a “public official” of 
the Host country’s government.227  Because many Host countries have 
“mixed economies” without clear distinctions between public- and 
privately-owned enterprises, disentangling the nature of a particular 
individual’s connection to the government can be a complicated matter 
requiring information primarily in the government’s hands.228  The 
requirement that a “foreign official” be involved also means that the vast 
majority of investigations require uncovering actions taken within the 
territory of the Host country.  As a consequence, the cooperation of Host 
countries is constantly solicited, with the SEC making hundreds of requests 
to foreign authorities for enforcement assistance, and vice versa, each year, 
including 1,264 requests in FY 2011.
229
  Thus, one commentator has 
 
 223 One recent example is the Tenaris case, which involved a European-based global 
energy materials manufacturer, investigated for alleged bribes in Uzbekistan and the Caspian 
Sea region, after the company was tipped by a customer dealing with a Tenaris agent outside 
of Uzbekistan.  See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Tenaris to Pay $5.4 Million 
in SEC’s First-Ever Deferred Prosecution Agreement (May 17, 2011), 
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-
112.htm?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+sec%2Fl
gHO+%28SEC.gov+Updates%3A+Press+Releases%29; The SEC Uses an FCPA Case for 
Its First-Ever Deferred Prosecution Agreement, GIBSON DUNN (May 19, 2011)  
http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/SECUsesFCPACaseForFirst-
EverDeferredProsecutionAgreement.aspx. 
 224 In a typical bid-rigging case, for example, the public harm only appears in the form of 
higher government expenditures resulting from the acceptance of otherwise uncompetitive 
bids, and harm to competitors who lose the bid and may not know that the loss was due to a 
bribe. 
 225 The FCPA defines a bribe vaguely to include “anything of value.”  15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 
(2011); see also Berger, Sheehy & Davis, supra note 153 (explaining the definitional 
ambiguity). 
 226 See Ashe, supra note 7, at 2916. 
 227 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a). 
 228 See Joel M. Cohen, Michael P. Holland & Adam P. Wolf, Under the FCPA, Who Is a 
Foreign Official Anyway?, 63 BUS. LAW. 1243, 1250 (2008). 
 229 See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, IN BRIEF FY 2013 CONGRESSIONAL JUSTIFICATION 30 
(2012), http://www.sec.gov/about/secfy13congbudgjust.pdf (showing requests for FY 2007 
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summed up the scope of the problem well: “Gathering the evidence 
necessary to carry out an investigation abroad is exceedingly difficult.  
Indeed, if the United States was unable to elicit cooperation from local 
agencies and officials, ‘[s]ecuring . . . proof [of official bribery] in a foreign 
country would be practically impossible.’”230 
Because FCPA investigations almost necessarily require coordination 
among law enforcement agencies and local officials in Host countries, the 
U.S. government has invested in a variety of programs and initiatives to 
further this end.
231
  For example, the SEC has entered into over thirty 
“bilateral information-sharing agreements” with regulators in other 
countries,
232
 some of which have been invoked in the FCPA context.
233
  
Mutual legal assistance treaties are another more binding mechanism 
serving a similar function, of which fifty-six were newly signed in 2008.
234
  
These treaties are “intend[ed] to facilitate extradition of individuals charged 
with transnational crimes and the sharing of information needed to 
investigate and prosecute those crimes”235 and will almost surely be used in 
the FCPA context.
236
  Multilateral anti-bribery treaties to which the United 
States is a party also uniformly contain major provisions on investigative 
 
to FY2011); Gregory S. Bruch, Recent SEC Foreign Payments Cases and the Road Ahead 
Under the New SEC Leadership, for the A.B.A. Center for Continuing Legal Educ., Nat’l 
Inst. (Mar. 21–22, 2002), available at WL N02FCPB ABA-LGLED B-151 . 
 230 Ashe, supra note 7, at 2916 (quoting NEIL H. JACOBY ET AL., BRIBERY AND EXTORTION 
IN WORLD BUSINESS: A STUDY OF CORPORATE POLITICAL PAYMENTS ABROAD 218 (1977)). 
 231 See id. at 2916–17 (providing an overview of U.S. efforts to coordinate with Host 
countries). 
 232 See id. at 2917 (explaining that the bilateral information-sharing agreements generally 
“require: (1) the exchange, upon request, of information contained in the files of the foreign 
regulator; (2) the taking of testimony under oath by the foreign regulator on behalf of the 
SEC; (3) inspections of regulated persons by the foreign regulator; and (4) the sharing with 
the SEC of the information and reports generated by those inspections”); ANNETTE L. 
NAZARETH & PAUL F. ROYE, THE SEC SPEAKS IN 2004, at 543, 552 (2004). 
 233 See generally Bruch, supra note 229; DEVON ENERGY CORP., FOREIGN CORRUPT 
PRACTICES ACT POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 14 (2009), available at 
http://www.dvn.com/CorporateGovernance/Documents/Foreign%20Corrupt%20Practices%2
0Act.PDF (publicly available corporate compliance document noting in reference to bilateral 
agreements that “the international movement against official corruption has spawned new 
cooperation mechanisms between U.S. enforcement officials and their foreign counterparts, 
which significantly increase the risk of investigation and prosecution”). 
 234 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, U.S./EU Agreements on Mutual Legal Assistance and 
Extradition Enter into Force (Feb. 2, 2010), available at  
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/February/10-opa-108.html. 
 235 Joseph P. Covington et al., New Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties Facilitate 
International Cooperation in FCPA Investigations, JENNER & BLOCK (Sept. 20, 2010), 
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=46ee0d77-9133-44fc-8486-3a61c16d97b3. 
 236 Id. 
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assistance and information sharing.
237
  Also, in 2008, the FBI created an 
International Corruption Unit to “oversee the increasing number of 
corruption and fraud investigations with an international nexus requiring 
extensive coordination with FBI field offices, legal attaché offices, U.S. 
federal agencies, and the law enforcement agencies of Host countries.”238  
The Executive Branch’s vigorous investment in these agreements and 
programs underscores how critical a cooperative relationship with Host 
countries is for successful foreign anti-bribery investigations. 
Host countries often have the best access to critical information 
relating to international corruption investigations.  Accordingly, the U.S. 
government has already taken a costly and multi-pronged approach to 
securing the cooperation of Host countries.  As Part IV.B argues infra, this 
Article’s proposal to transfer disgorgement remedies would complement 
efforts already in place and provide Host countries with both the resources 
and incentives to comply. 
2.  Host Country Incentives and More Effective Enforcement 
The potential to receive disgorged profits resulting from an FCPA 
investigation would give Host countries a financial stake in the success of 
investigations and a stronger incentive to discover and produce information 
to U.S. Enforcement Agencies.  It would also provide resources to Host 
countries, allowing them to prioritize corruption enforcement and make 
more general efforts to control the demand-side of corruption.  Lastly, the 
proposal would facilitate a more local approach that leverages the 
efficiencies of domestic enforcement while mitigating concerns that FCPA 
enforcement amounts to an act of cultural imperialism or functions as a de 
facto sanction against lower-income countries. 
Ideally, a foreign government will be public-regarding and concerned 
with the corruption of its domestic officials.  But even under this best-case 
scenario, under-enforcement of anti-bribery prohibitions should be expected 
to occur because of the free-rider problem.
239
  The opportunity for Host 
countries to free-ride is a result of the bilateral nature of bribery; as game 
theorist Kaushik Basu explains: “once a bribe is given, the bribe giver and 
the bribe taker become partners in crime.  It is in their joint interest to keep 
 
 237 G.A. Res. 58/4, supra note 11, art. 43, 43 I.L.M. at 30 (providing requirements 
concerning “international cooperation”); OECD Convention, supra note 10, art. 9, 37 I.L.M. 
at 10 (providing requirements concerning “Mutual Legal Assistance”). 
 238 See Bridget M. Rhode & Steve Ganis, Foreign Corrupt Practices ACT (FCPA) Alert: 
The DoJ’s FCPA Crackdown on the Pharmaceutical and Medical Devices Industry, MINTZ 
LEVIN (Sept. 2010), http://www.mintz.com/newsletter/2010/Advisories/0665-0910-NAT-
WC/web.html. 
 239 See generally The Free Rider Problem, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (May 21, 2003), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/free-rider/. 
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this fact hidden from the authorities and to be fugitives from the law, 
because, if caught, both expect to be punished.”240  The bilateral bribe 
relationship means that virtually any U.S. Enforcement Agency 
investigation into the supply-side of bribes will also uncover information 
about the demand-side misbehavior of foreign public officials.  Thus, U.S. 
investigative activity carries a non-excludable benefit, or positive 
externality,
241
 for Host countries that have a preference for deterring bribery 
and regard corruption control as a public good.  A conscientious foreign 
government that seeks to discipline its bureaucracy will therefore have an 
incentive to free-ride off of the enforcement investment by the United 
States in “FBI field offices[and] . . . legal attaché offices,”242 and the like.  
Importantly, this dynamic will not be limited to the context of a particular 
investigation and would also apply over time to induce a more general 




While transferring disgorgement still constitutes an investment on the 
part of the United States, its conditionality can reduce free-riding.  
Conditionality means that supply-side investigations in foreign countries 
would carry a benefit from which the Host country could be excluded if it 
did not cooperate: withdrawal of disgorged profits would then be a cost of 
non-cooperation that the Host country “internalizes.”244  Proceeding from 
the assumption that states at least some of the time rationally respond to the 
 
 240 Kaushik Basu, Why, For a Class of Bribes, the Act of Giving a Bribe Should Be 
Treated as Legal 5 (Mar. 2011) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://finmin.nic.in/WorkingPaper/Act_Giving_Bribe_Legal.pdf. 
 241 See generally Tyler Cowen, Public Goods and Externalities, in THE CONCISE 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECONOMICS (David R. Henderson ed., 1st ed. 1993), available at 
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc1/PublicGoodsandExternalities.html (“Externalities occur 
when one person’s actions affect another person’s well-being and the relevant costs and 
benefits are not reflected in market prices. . . .  Note that the free-rider problem and positive 
externalities are two sides of the same coin.”); Ronald Coase, The Lighthouse in Economics, 
17 J.L. & ECON. 357 (1974) (providing a seminal treatment of the free-rider problem by 
examining the excludability of lighthouse services in England). 
 242 See Rhode & Ganis, supra note 238. 
 243 See Kevin E. Davis, Does the Globalization of Anti-Corruption Law Help Developing 
Countries? 16 (N.Y. Univ. Law & Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 09-52, 2009), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1520553 (“Suppose that victims of corruption could 
rely on foreign police forces, prosecutors, lawyers, and courts to investigate, prosecute and 
adjudicate complaints of bribery and to levy criminal or civil sanctions.  In that case, why 
would those victims invest any effort in complaining about or pressing for the improvement 
of local courts, and so on?”). 
 244 See Cowen, supra note 241 (providing a roughly analogous example in the private 
sector context: “If the research and development activities of one firm benefit other firms in 
the same industry, these firms may pool their resources and agree to a joint project (antitrust 
regulations permitting).  Each firm will pay part of the cost, and the contributing firms will 
share the benefits.  In this context economists say that the externalities are ‘internalized.’”). 
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costs and benefits of various policies, it is likely that providing Host 
countries a financial stake in the success of investigations would induce 
cooperation more readily than signing any number of “bilateral information 
sharing agreements” would.245  At the same time, conditionality would 
complement legal agreements already in place, which could serve as 
guidance as to which forms of Host country assistance are expected and 




A policy of conditionally transferring disgorgement may also help 
fund the efforts of Host countries—which often have limited resources or 
capacity to prioritize anti-corruption programs and investigations—to 
constrain the demand-side of bribery more generally.
247
  Transfer of 
proceeds could conceivably be accompanied by a further condition that they 
are spent on corruption reform.  Even if such a level of micromanagement is 
undesirable, or might not be realistically enforced, such transfers may 
increase attention to corruption in two ways.  One mechanism is through a 
governmental “wealth effect,”248 in which an increased government budget 
leads to increased expenditures on “normal” public goods across the 
board,
249
 including corruption control.  Second, one would expect transfers 
in some cases to be channeled disproportionately towards demand-side 
corruption control, because a successful investigation and the 
accompanying disgorgement revenue could increase the status and 
influence of leaders favoring investigative cooperation and provide 
momentum for more general reform of the Host country’s bureaucracy.250 
 
 245 To be precise, a perfectly rational government would be willing to spend no more on 
investigative assistance than the present-discounted value of any ill-gotten profits multiplied 
by the probability of receiving such profits from the United States.  See supra note 233 and 
accompanying text (describing the proliferation of bilateral information sharing agreements). 
 246 See infra note 307 and accompanying text (explaining the analogous “definitional” 
role of legal instruments in the treaty context). 
 247 See generally Joarder Mohammad Abdul Munim, Fiscal Capacity and Multiple-
Equilibria of Corruption: Cross-Country Evidence, 24 J. INT’L DEV. 34 (2012) (finding 
evidence of a positive relationship between a state’s “revenue capacity” and its ability to 
control corruption). 
 248 “Wealth effect” is an economic term that refers to an increase in spending that 
accompanies an increase in perceived wealth.  See Michael R. Darby, Wealth Effect, in THE 
NEW PALGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 883–85 (1987). 
 249 A “normal good” is any good with a positive income elasticity of demand, or in other 
words, any good for which, given constant prices, demand increases when income increases 
and falls when income decreases.  Corruption-free government, like public safety or 
environmental quality, is almost certainly a normal public good in the sense that jurisdictions 
with higher incomes demand more investment in reducing corruption.  See, e.g., 
TRANSPARENCY INT’L, supra note 217 (showing a clear correlation between national income 
and levels of corruption). 
 250 See ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 104, at 199–212 (describing a set of conditions 
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Even a modest increase in resources expended on demand-side 
corruption control may produce substantial results.  The more realistic 
models of corruption take into account historical attitudes towards 
corruption and predict that different social expectations about the incidence 
of corruption can “generate multiple equilibria whereby organizations or 
societies with the same institutional characteristics can experience very 
different corruption levels.”251  An important implication of the multiple 
equilibria feature of corruption is that a mere temporary increase in 
domestic enforcement efforts can have a lasting effect on corruption levels, 
as a one-time “cleanup campaign” can shift the expectations of government 
officials and tip a bureaucracy from a high-corruption equilibrium to a low-
corruption equilibrium.
252
  Furthermore, a low-corruption equilibrium may 
be stable even after reducing enforcement resources.
253
  Confirmation of 
these principles in actual “big push” anti-corruption campaigns has been 
found in diverse settings, such as the Italian judiciary, public hospitals in 




In addition to facilitating direct enforcement efforts, disgorgement 
transfers could also supply a source of funds for the somewhat unseemly 
but often very necessary process of compensating the “losers” from 
domestic anti-corruption policies.
255
  One example of compensation is “civil 
service reform where salaries and working conditions are improved in 
 
under which democratic and autocratic leaders may find pro-reform positions to be in their 
personal interest). 
 251 Toke S. Aidt, Economic Analysis of Corruption: A Survey, 113 ECON. J. F632, F647 
(2003). 
 252 See Mark Kleiman & Beau Kilmer, The Dynamics of Deterrence, 106 PROCEEDINGS 
NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. U.S. 14230, 14230 (2009) (“If potential offenders are sufficiently 
deterrable, increasing the conditional probability of punishment (given violation) can reduce 
the amount of punishment actually inflicted, by “tipping” a situation from its high-violation 
equilibrium to its low-violation equilibrium.”), available at 
http://www.pnas.org/content/106/34/14230.full.pdf+html; Francis T. Lui, A Dynamic Model 
of Corruption Deterrence, 31 J. PUB. ECON. 215, 232 (1986). 
 253 ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 104, at 56 (“Once a new low corruption equilibrium has 
been established, it can be maintained with reduced enforcement resources.”); see also 
Olivier Cadot, Corruption as a Gamble, 33 J. PUB. ECON. 223 (1987). 
 254 Rafael Di Tella & Ernesto Schargrodsky, The Role of Wages and Auditing During a 
Crackdown on Corruption in the City of Buenos Aires, 46 J.L. & ECON. 269 (2003) (detailing 
the Argentine experience in the 1990s); Max J. Skidmore, Promise and Peril in Combating 
Corruption: Hong Kong’s ICAC, 547 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 118 (1996) 
(covering Hong Kong); Antonio Acconcia & Claudia Cantabene, A Big Push to Deter 
Corruption: Evidence from Italy (Ctr. for Studies in Econs. & Fin., Working Paper No. 159, 
2008) (covering Italy). 
 255 See ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 104, at 219–22 (arguing that side-payments to 
corrupt officials exiting the bureaucracy are often required to “sustain reform”). 
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return for officials forgoing bribery receipts.”256  Such a side-payment may 
be effective in high-bribery countries where tolerating bribery is often 
considered a part of remuneration for an otherwise under-paid bureaucracy.  
Another mechanism could take the form of “golden handshakes,” with 
which support for shrinking a predatory public sector is won through a one-
time windfall offered to exiting civil servants.
257
 
Understood most broadly, transferring revenue to the Host country 
would imply a more local approach to anti-bribery enforcement.
258
  The 
proposal would thereby meet several “powerful objections to the idea of 
relying on foreign legal institutions to perform roles that might, at least in 
principle, be played by domestic ones.”259  For reasons concerning access to 
information described in Part IV.A.i, it is likely that deploying local 
resources would often be more efficient than deploying foreign resources.
260
  
Development of domestic anti-corruption institutions also facilitates a 
process of “learning-by-doing” and reduces the potential that “foreign 
institutions will serve as substitutes for displaced domestic institutions that 
may, even if only over time, offer equal or even superior performance.”261 
A final advantage of this proposal and its local approach is that 
incorporating Host countries as financial partners in bribery investigations 
would in part meet the critique that foreign anti-bribery efforts are 
indifferent or hostile to Host country interests.
262
  Criticisms of this sort 
often argue that the imposition of Western definitions of bribery constitutes 
an act of “cultural imperialism.”263  Another strain of commentary focuses 
 
 256 Id. at 219. 
 257 Id. 
 258 Cf. F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945) 
(emphasizing the efficiency gains from using local knowledge to allocate resources through 
the price mechanism). 
 259 Davis, supra note 243 at 3.  Davis, a law and development scholar, develops three 
categories of objections: (1) foreign institutions may have motivations that are indifferent or 
hostile to the Host country’s welfare; (2) foreign institutions may provide solutions 
incompatible with local institutions and norms; and (3) foreign interventions may substitute 
for or displace domestic efforts that may prove superior over time.  Id. at 3–4. 
 260 This argument tracks Davis’s “incompatibility” category of objections.  See id. at 13–
15. 
 261 Id. at 4.  For a condensed version of Davis’s “institutional displacement” objection, 
see id. at 15–17. 
 262 See id. at 11–13 (outlining the “indifference” objection). 
 263 See, e.g., Steven R. Salbu, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act as a Threat to Global 
Harmony, 20 MICH. J. INT’L L. 419 (1999); but see ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 104, at 177 
(arguing that this view is condescending: “many scholars from developing countries argue 
that this fashionable [cultural imperialism] critique is based on a mischaracterization of local 
practices.  They make it clear that traditions of gift giving do not translate into widespread 
acceptance of corrupt practices.  Citizen surveys and expression of public outrage suggests 
that widespread tolerance of corruption is not common.”). 
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on the sanction-like effect of FCPA enforcement and the economic harm it 
may impose on Host countries.
264
  Making Host countries financial and 
enforcement co-partners in corruption investigations would reduce the 
perception that efforts to eliminate corruption are acts of cultural or 
economic hegemony. 
3.  Potential Criticisms and Summary 
Allocating disgorgement proceeds to the Host country instead of the 
U.S. Treasury via the SEC is a simple proposal that becomes more 
complicated and vulnerable to criticism at the implementation phase.  
However, conditioning the transfer of disgorgement revenue would not be a 
wholly novel policy approach.  The United States modified its traditional 
foreign aid policy in 2002 with the Millennium Challenge Account, a 
program intended to screen out countries likely to waste foreign funds while 
channeling aid to those nations who will use the assistance for the benefit of 
their populations.
265
  This Article’s proposal merely consists of an 
application of this general approach to the specific context of anti-bribery 
enforcement.
266
  And in fact, the SEC is already statutorily authorized to set 
up a “fund” to transfer disgorgement proceeds to third parties through the 
Fair Funds provisions of SOX.
267
  The disgorgement policy put forward 
here would apply this basic mechanism to set up a fund for Host countries 
that likely suffer more harm from FCPA violations than investors in 
corporations guilty of foreign bribery,
268
 an approach the U.K. has 
experimented with under its recent Bribery Act.
269
 
An obvious concern is that some of the Host countries where FCPA 
investigations take place are ruled by “kleptocratic” governments that have 
no interest in deterring corruption and function primarily to extract 
resources from the general population.
270
  Kleptocracies, as well as 
countries with antagonistic diplomatic relationships with the United 
 
 264 See Spalding, supra note 7. 
 265 See generally Margaret Dennis, A New Approach to Foreign Aid: A Case Study of the 
Millennium Challenge Account (Inst. for Int’l Law & Justice, Emerging Scholars Paper No. 
12, 2008), available at http://www.iilj.org/publications/documents/Dennis.ESP12-08.pdf. 
 266 2010 was the SEC’s highest “grossing” year for disgorgement, yielded roughly $500 
million in settlements.  See supra notes 47, 72–75, and accompanying text. 
 267 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 308, 15 U.S.C. § 7246 (2011); see also Money 
Laundering Control Act of 1986 § 1366(a), 18 U.S.C. § 981(i) (2011) (amended 2012) 
(providing for civil or criminal forfeiture of property and transfer to eligible foreign 
countries that participated in the seizure of that property). 
 268 See supra notes 61, 63 and accompanying paragraph. 
 269 See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
 270 See ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 104, at 114 (distinguishing between “kleptocracies 
where corruption is organized at the top of government and other states where bribery is the 
province of a large number of low-level officials”). 





 could be identified
272
 and made ineligible for disgorgement funds.  
Making these countries ineligible need not eviscerate the policy.  In the 
past, many Host countries subject to FCPA investigations have been 
middle-income nations with relatively non-parasitic governments that do 
not rise to the level of kleptocracy.
273
 
Another concern is the sheer magnitude of transfers that could be 
implicated.  In 2010, the SEC’s highest “grossing” year for disgorgement, 
settlements yielded roughly $500 million, an inarguably large amount of 
money.
274
  However, this number pales in comparison to the total amount of 
U.S. Agency for International Development funds disbursed that same year, 
which totaled around $43 billion.
275
  The amount actually transferred to 
Host countries should be expected to be less than the $500 million figure, 
because: (1) 2010 was a “banner” year for the SEC;276 (2) removing the 
money from the U.S. coffers should discourage the SEC’s increasingly 
inflated disgorgement calculations;
277
 and (3) not all Host countries will be 
cooperative or otherwise eligible for disgorgement transfers. 
Conditionally granting disgorgement proceeds to cooperative Host 
countries with functioning governments would make foreign anti-bribery 
enforcement more effective.  Free-riding off U.S. investments in anti-
bribery investigations could be reduced as Host countries with unique 
access to investigation-relevant information are incentivized to become 
partners in the investigation.  The proceeds from successful investigations 
 
 271 See U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., EFFECTS OF U.S. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE ON 
DEMOCRACY BUILDING: RESULTS OF A CROSS-NATIONAL QUANTITATIVE STUDY 14, 19–22, 
30–32 (2006), available at http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pnade694.pdf (providing tables of 
countries with incomes making them “eligible” for U.S. Agency for International 
Development funds, but receiving none). 
 272  An easy starting point for identifying kleptocracies could be by reference to the 
lowest rankings on Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index.  See 
TRANSPARENCY INT’L, supra note 217. 
 273 See, e.g., Diageo plc, Exchange Act Release No. 64,978 (July 27, 2011), available at 
http://fcpa.shearman.com/?s=matter&mode=form&id=31a9b4d349230e5ee7b20283a081f9e
2 (noting that the SEC alleged that the international beverage distributor Diageo made 
prohibited payments to public officials in India, Thailand, and South Korea).  Certainly 
South Korea is a relatively wealthy and well-functioning democracy that cannot fairly be 
described as a “kleptocracy.”  See generally James Mintz Grp., Where The Bribes Are, 
FCPA MAP, http://www.fcpamap.com (tracking global incidence of FCPA penalties) (last 
visited Jan. 2, 2013). 
 274 See supra note 47 (providing the dollar breakdown of the 2010 SEC settlements). 
 275 See U.S. AGENCY FOR INT’L DEV., EXECUTIVE BUDGET SUMMARY, FUNCTION 150 & 
OTHER INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS, FISCAL YEAR 2012, at 2 (2011), available at 
http://transition.usaid.gov/performance/cbj/156214.pdf. 
 276 See Koehler, supra note 137 (describing 2010 as the FCPA’s “biggest” and “boldest” 
to date).  2011 saw only a slight drop off in FCPA penalties compared to 2010.  See Berger 
et al., supra note 81. 
 277 See supra note 168 and accompanying paragraph. 
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could also be a springboard for more general efforts by the Host 
government to begin curbing the demand-side of bribery.  Host countries 
taking a greater role in the enforcement effort would also help quell 
concerns that anti-bribery enforcement is a form of Western cultural 
imperialism or de facto sanctions.  Finally, the stringency of the 
“cooperation” threshold could be calibrated to reflect the appropriate 
tradeoff between the importance of Host country assistance and the value 
derived from transferring more resources to international organizations 
tasked with coordinating the enforcement of supply-side states. 
B.  Disgorgement to International Organizations 
The under-enforcement problem does not only, or even primarily, 
afflict Host countries responsible for policing the demand-side of 
corruption.  Almost all of the world’s capital-exporting advanced 
economies are members of the OECD and parties to the OECD Convention, 
a treaty patterned largely after the FCPA that requires members to prosecute 
legal persons responsible for supplying bribes to foreign jurisdictions.
278
  
With the exception of the United States, and the U.K. since 2011, 
compliance with the OECD Convention has been tepid at best.
279
  
Lackluster enforcement of the supply-side of bribery by OECD members is 
not due to a defect in the language or provisions of the OECD Convention.  
Instead, structural features of the treaty create a collective action problem in 
which each member state has the incentive to strategically under-enforce 
foreign bribery by its nationals. 
The final part of this Article’s proposal is to transfer proceeds from 
FCPA disgorgement to the OECD Working Group—the entity that was 
established to monitor the implementation of the OECD Convention
280—
when cooperation by a Host country is not forthcoming.  The collective 
action problem created by the treaty makes effective enforcement critically 
depend on member states’ ability to monitor one another’s compliance.  In 
the specific context of international business corruption, international 
organizations such as the Working Group can be particularly useful in 
facilitating international anti-bribery efforts and making the OECD 
 
 278 OECD Convention, supra note 10, art. 2 (“Each Party shall take such measures as may 
be necessary, in accordance with its legal principles, to establish the liability of legal persons 
for the bribery of a foreign public official.”); see also Westbrook, supra note 2, at 511 (“The 
OECD Convention requires signatory countries to enact measures that are substantively 
similar to the prohibitions in the FCPA . . . .”). 
 279 See infra note 288 and accompanying paragraph. 
 280 See OECD Convention, supra note 10, art. 12 (“Monitoring and Follow-Up: The 
Parties shall co-operate in carrying out a programme of systematic follow-up to monitor and 
promote the full implementation of this Convention. Unless otherwise decided by consensus 
of the Parties, this shall be done in the framework of the OECD Working Group on Bribery 
in International Business Transactions and according to its terms of reference . . . .”). 
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Convention more effective because of their monitoring and information 
aggregating functions.  This approach—which enables states to more 
efficiently self-police compliance with their treaty commitments—is likely 
to be more successful than various proposals to create more treaties, 
strengthen treaty language, or empower international organizations with a 
more direct, prosecutorial role for which they are ill-suited. 
1.  The Failure of Multilateral Enforcement 
While the U.S. government has unilaterally ratcheted up its anti-
bribery enforcement through investigations under the FCPA, it has also 
aggressively lobbied on the international level for a multilateral approach to 
anti-corruption.
281
  The importance of a multilateral approach is often 
expressed as the need for an “even playing field” among multinational 
corporations: if only U.S. corporations are subject to anti-bribery laws, they 
will be disadvantaged in foreign markets when competing against 
companies that are not so constrained.
282
  A lack of multilateralism not only 
comes at a cost to the U.S. economy, but also makes efforts to reduce 
corruption generally less efficacious.  This is because the unilateral 
withdrawal of U.S. corporate investment from jurisdictions where bribery 
takes place will only induce corporations from capital-exporting countries 
that less actively enforce bribery to move in to fill the economic void.
283
 
The United States has largely been successful in its effort at forging 
international agreements to combat foreign bribery;284 multilateral 
enforcement, on the other hand, has lagged considerably behind the signing 
of international conventions.
285
  In 2009, Transparency International 
 
 281 See Ashe, supra note 7, at 2908 (“[W]ithout an international agreement in place, U.S. 
interests were suffering significantly despite the 1988 amendments, especially in emerging 
markets. U.S. efforts to get the international community on board continued through the 
1990s.”); see also H.R. REP. NO. 100-576 (1988) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1988 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1547 (legislative comment to 1988 Amendments exhorting the U.S. 
government to pursue an international anti-bribery convention). 
 282 See Presidential Statement, supra note 42 (“U.S. companies have had to compete on 
an uneven playing field, resulting in losses of international contracts estimated at $30 billion 
per year.”); Tarullo, supra note 12, at 674 (“U.S. business interests argued for substantial 
modification or repeal of the FCPA so as to create a ‘level playing field’ in international 
markets.”). 
 283 See Spalding, supra note 7, at 397; James R. Hines, Forbidden Payment: Foreign 
Bribery and American Business After 1977, at 19–20 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 5266, 1995) (finding that the FCPA encouraged “ownership 
substitution” in the 1970s between U.S. investors—the only investors subject to anti-bribery 
legislation at the time—and foreign investors). 
 284 See supra notes 92–95 (listing the handful of anti-bribery treaties that have 
proliferated in recent years). 
 285 See Tarullo, supra note 12, at 666, 682–83 (“The wave of international arrangements 
raises the question of why, after many barren years, anti-corruption initiatives bore so much 
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reported that only three of the thirty-seven non-U.S. parties to the OECD 
Convention (Germany, Norway, Switzerland) had actively enforced their 
anti-corruption laws, while twenty-one had seen little or no enforcement.
286
  
Even this estimate may over-state the total amount of activity, however, as 
the patches of enforcement that have occurred are primarily from an outlier 
case involving the U.N. oil-for-food scandal.
287
  Progress has not been 
substantial since TI’s 2009 report, and its 2011 report concluded that “there 
has been no progress since TI’s 2010 progress report in the number of 
countries with active enforcement.”288 
The disjunction between readily joining anti-bribery treaties and 
subsequently not complying with them reflects a rational calculation on the 
part of OECD member states.
289
  Simply agreeing to join anti-corruption 
conventions is relatively costless if it is not accompanied by a genuine 
commitment to invest in compliance.
290
  In addition, ratification may carry 
certain non-trivial “expressive” benefits that follow from taking positions 
consistent with values encouraged by the international community.
291
  For 
this reason, states often sign treaties, including the OECD Convention, in 





fruit so quickly. The ineffectiveness of the arrangements raises the question of why the 
apparent commitment of state and non-state actors to combat corruption dissipated after the 
international agreements were signed.”). 
 286 FRITZ HEIMANN & GILLIAN DELL, TRANSPARENCY INT’L, PROGRESS REPORT 2009: 
ENFORCEMENT OF THE OECD CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC 
OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 8 (2009). 
 287 Id. at 4 (“Many of the cases and investigations mentioned in . . . this report relate to 
the Oil-for-Food Programme that was established by the United Nations (UN) Security 
Council in 1995 and began operation at the end of 1996.”). 
 288 TRANSPARENCY INT’L, supra note 214. 
 289 See Oona Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 
1935, 2002 (2002) (“[C]ountries will comply with treaties only when doing so enhances their 
interests, whether those interests are defined in terms of geopolitical power, reputation, or 
domestic impact.”). 
 290 Id. at 2006 (“And where there is little enforcement, the costs of [treaty] membership 
are also small, as countries with policies that do not adhere to the requirements of the treaty 
are unlikely to be penalized.”). 
 291 See id. at 2005 (“In this sense [of expressing agreement with the basic values of the 
treaty], the ratification of a treaty functions much as a roll-call vote in the U.S. Congress or a 
speech in favor of the temperance movement, as a pleasing statement not necessarily 
intended to have any real effect on outcomes.”). 
 292 Marco Celentani, Juan-Jose Ganuza & Jose-Luis Peydro, Combating Corruption in 
International Business Transactions, 71 ECONOMICA 417, 418 (2004) (“[R]ecent evidence on 
the OECD Convention clarifies that a country that signs a convention may in the end choose 
not to enforce it.  This in turn implies that the meaningful decision is not whether to sign the 
Convention or not, but rather whether or not to enforce it.”); Hathaway, supra note 289, at 
2006 (providing a statistical study that finds a weak but positive correlation between signing 
 A Political Economy Approach to Reforming the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
33:325 (2013) 
381 
The incentive structure facing signatory states changes once the 
question becomes expending resources to actually comply with the treaty.  
At the compliance stage, international efforts to enforce anti-bribery rules 
through the OECD Convention have not materialized, because the 
Convention is subject to the same collective action problems that plague 
many other multilateral agreements.  Specifically, Daniel Tarullo and 
others
293
 have modeled members of international anti-bribery conventions 
as facing a multi-player prisoner’s dilemma.  The prisoner’s dilemma 
dynamic
294
 means that each state’s dominant strategy295 is to shirk on 
deterring the bribery of its domestic corporations while at the same time 




The basic prisoner’s dilemma analysis297 is on the whole persuasive, 
but incomplete in that it cannot explain the United States’ increasing 
willingness to pursue FCPA enforcement.
298
  The explanation is likely not 
that the United States is uniquely harmed by its nationals’ bribery.  Instead, 
the United States is probably an outlier because of its ability to unilaterally 
“even the playing field” by regularly investigating foreign companies and 
funding its prosecutorial efforts through penalties disproportionately levied 
 
human rights treaties and committing human right abuses, and concluding, “Where there is 
little monitoring, noncompliance is not likely to be exposed.  Therefore, the countries that 
join the treaty will enjoy the expressive benefits of joining the treaty, regardless of whether 
they actually comply with the treaty’s requirements.”). 
 293 See generally Davis, supra note 12, at 27 (“[Policing bribery] creates a form of 
prisoners’ dilemma for payor states: it may be possible for them to maximize their collective 
welfare by penalising some forms of transnational bribery; however, it may not be in the best 
interests of any individual state to act unilaterally because of the adverse competitive 
implications.”); Tarullo, supra note 12, at 666; COMM. ON INT’L BUS. TRANSACTIONS, N.Y. 
CITY BAR, THE FCPA AND ITS IMPACT ON INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 14–16 
(2011). 
 294 See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ROBERT H. GERTNER & RANDAL C. PICKER, GAME THEORY 
AND THE LAW 33–34 (Harvard Univ. Press paperback ed. 1998) (providing a narrative 
explanation of the prisoner’s dilemma game); ROGER B. MYERSON, GAME THEORY: 
ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT 97 (1997) (providing a more mathematical explication). 
 295 In game theory, a “dominant strategy” is any course of action which makes an actor 
better off than alternative strategies, regardless of the actions of any other participants in the 
game.  See BAIRD, supra note 294, at 11–12. 
 296 See COMM. ON INT’L BUS. TRANSACTIONS, supra note 293; Davis, supra note 12, at 27; 
Tarullo, supra note 12, at 666. 
 297 See generally Davis, supra note 12, at 41–43; Tarullo, supra note 12. 
 298 Tarullo’s analysis awkwardly treats the United States’ commitment to enforcement 
alternatively as a given, or as a result of mid-1970s scandals and the push for an OECD 
Convention in the 1990s.  See Tarullo, supra note 12, at 668–80.  But this repeats the 
mistake of conflating the incentives to sign anti-bribery laws with the incentives to actually 
enforce them.   
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  However, the singular position of the United States, 
and now possibly the U.K.,
300
 does not alter the strategic incentives of the 
vast majority of OECD member states.  Thus, the essential non-compliance 
by member states other than the United States remains a core problem with 
the OECD Convention, preventing it from being effective. 
2.  Enforcing Collective Action 
The prisoner’s dilemma dynamic is a general problem that impedes 
collective enforcement of the OECD Convention as well as many other 
ambitious treaty agreements
301
 that attempt to govern the provision of 
international public goods.
302
  Collective action problems on the 
international level can be extremely difficult to solve, because the 
international system is essentially anarchic,
303
 in that there is no central 
world-governmental authority in a position to punish states for failure to 
 
 299 Recall that ninety percent of the dollar value of FCPA penalties in 2010 were imposed 
on non-U.S. companies.  See supra note 137 and accompanying text.  Recall also that nine of 
the ten largest FCPA penalties ever have been imposed against non-U.S. corporations, and 
that every investigation initiated in 2011 was against a foreign corporation.  See Berger et al., 
supra note 81. 
 300 The unilateralism calculus may apply to the U.K. after passage of its 2010 Bribery Act 
as “[t]he jurisdictional reach of the Act extends beyond the UK, and Serious Fraud Office 
(SFO) officials who will be prosecuting violations of the Act have signaled their intention to 
assert broad jurisdiction . . . .”  Roger M. Witten et al., Preparing for Doing Business Under 
the UK Bribery Act, WILMER HALE (Oct. 6, 2010), 
http://www.wilmerhale.com/publications/whPubsDetail.aspx?publication=9614; see also 
U.K. Bribery Act, c. 23, § 19 (2010). 
 301 See JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 87 
(2005) (arguing that international agreements concerning “true international public goods 
such as the protection of fisheries, the reduction of atmospheric pollution, and peace . . . are 
multilateral prisoner’s dilemmas, not coordination games”); ANDREW GUZMAN, HOW 
INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY 29–33 (2008). 
 302 A corruption-free global marketplace is an “international public good” in the sense 
that “payers and nonpayers receive its benefits, and one person’s consumption does not 
necessarily reduce the benefits still available to others from the same unit of the good.”  
Todd Sandler, Financing International Public Goods, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS: 
INCENTIVES, MEASUREMENT, AND FINANCING 81, 81 (Marco Ferroni & Ashoka Mody eds., 
2002). 
 303 See Andrew Moravcsik & Frank Schimmelfennig, Liberal Intergovernmentalism, in 
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION THEORY 67, 68 (Antje Wiener & Thomas Diez eds., 2d ed. 2009) 
(arguing in the European context that “[t]he EU, like other international institutions, can 
profitably be studied by treating states as the critical actors in the context of anarchy”); 
Robert Hudec, “Transcending the Ostensible”: Some Reflections on the Nature of Litigation 
Between Governments, 72 MINN. L. REV. 211, 212 (1988) (“[I]nternational legal 
arrangements have relatively more in common with the law of primitive societies studied by 
anthropologists, in which litigation is still emerging as a rather tenuous alternative to dispute 
resolution by force.”). 
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comply with their international legal obligations.
304
  As a consequence, 
states participating in multilateral treaty regimes are forced to engage in a 
decentralized process of mutual-policing by imposing costs or providing 
benefits to other member states in order to change the positive payoff 
associated with free-riding on treaty commitments.
305
 
A prerequisite of this decentralized enforcement process is overcoming 
the informational and monitoring problem of determining when the actions 
of a member state constitute non-compliance.
306
  A treaty agreement itself 
serves the vital definitional role of laying out an abstract legal standard for 
what constitutes compliance on the part of signatories.
307
  However, it 
leaves unanswered the often more complex factual question of which 
particular real-world acts of treaty members fall within the legal rule, which 
is a question that can only be answered through investment in collecting 
information on state behavior.
308
 
Monitoring compliance with international anti-corruption conventions 
is more difficult than monitoring compliance is for most international 
economic agreements.  In the case of breaches of free trade agreements, for 
example, it is not overly difficult for states to identify when their exports 
are subject to tariffs or other trade barriers by treaty partners.
309
  Compare 
instances of under-enforcement of the OECD Convention’s anti-bribery 
provisions, where the relevant activity involves secretive transactions and 
turns on complicated facts, and where treaty members must be expected to 
 
 304 See ERIC A. POSNER, THE PERILS OF GLOBAL LEGALISM 7 (2009)  (“At the international 
level, no world government exists, and so no entity has the power to tax and regulate states, 
or the individuals who live in them, in order to ensure that collective goods are produced.”). 
 305 GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 301, at 86 (“To solve collective action problems, 
players must be able to monitor each other and commit to punishing any player who free-
rides, and that includes any player who fails to punish another player who free-rides.”).  
Whether this is through material threats and promises or moral suasion, the underlying 
analysis remains the same.  See Tarullo, supra note 12, at 690–91. 
 306 GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 301. 
 307 Id. at 85 (“In repeated prisoner’s dilemmas, when the [international treaty] agreement 
sets out clearly what counts as a cooperative action, unintended defections are reduced, and 
it becomes more difficult for a state to engage in opportunism and then deny that the action 
violated the requirements of a cooperative game.”). 
 308 Id. at 86. 
 309 See Chad P. Bown, Trade Remedies and World Trade Organization Dispute 
Settlement: Why Are So Few Challenged? 1 (World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper 
No. 3540, 2005), available at 
http://econ.worldbank.org/external/default/main?pagePK=64165259&theSitePK=469372&p
iPK=64165421&menuPK=64166093&entityID=000012009_20050317142750 (“That such a 
large share of the WTO dispute settlement caseload involves challenges to antidumping, 
countervailing duties and safeguards is perhaps not surprising, given the relative 
transparency of these policies . . . .”). 
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exercise a degree of prosecutorial discretion.
310
  For these reasons, and 
because of the necessary role of monitoring in enforcing compliance with 
multilateral treaties, it is accurate to say that “[t]he most obvious 
shortcoming of current institutional arrangements under the OECD 
Convention is the absence of information flows about specific instances of 
bribery.”311 
Once investment in monitoring is sufficient to identify acts of 
compliance and non-compliance, there remains the problem of inducing 
non-enforcing treaty partners to perform by ensuring that the benefits of 
compliance exceed its cost.  One mechanism through which monitoring can 
change states’ cost-benefit calculus is the production of “reputational 
effects.”312  Monitoring disseminates information about a state’s propensity 
to comply with its international commitments, and thereby affects its 
reputation for compliance.  A reputation for compliance can be a valuable 
asset, because states with reputations for cheating on commitments will 
have their promises discounted and will not be able to credibly commit to 
future cooperative endeavors.
313
  Thus, monitoring of state behavior 
encourages compliance by creating a cost to non-compliance that would not 
otherwise exist. 
A more direct vehicle for re-aligning the cost-benefit considerations of 
treaty partners is the delivery of “side-payments,” which increase the 
benefits of compliance.  In bargaining theory, “once the value-maximizing 
agreement is identified, parties that prefer the status quo (or some 
alternative agreement) can be compensated with a transfer or cash or 
something else”314 in order to secure performance under the agreement.  
Such transfers are referred to as side-payments, and can be used to 
“[i]ncrease the payoff for a government’s prosecuting overseas bribery by 
 
 310 See generally Tarullo, supra note 12, at 689 (“Bribery takes place in the shadows. It 
may never be visible to anyone but the immediate actors. Where there are hints of bribery, 
investigations backed with some form of compulsory process may be necessary to establish 
the case that a signatory is obliged to take action. Finally, even if there is information 
available . . .  [i]t may not be an easy matter to distinguish instances of good faith non-
prosecution from instances where prosecutors have ignored overseas commercial bribery in 
order to boost the competitive position of their country’s firms.”). 
 311 Tarullo, supra note 12, at 695. 
 312 See Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 CALIF. 
L. REV. 1823, 1861–64 (2002) (discussing reputational sanctions as an enforcement 
mechanism); see generally Rachel Brewster, Unpacking the State’s Reputation, 50 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 231 (2009) (providing an overview of the strengths and weaknesses of reputation 
as an analytical tool in international legal scholarship). 
 313 See GUZMAN, supra note 301, at 34–35. 
 314 Id. at 166; see also Roman M. Sheremeta & Erik O. Kimbrough, Side-Payments and 
the Costs of Conflict (Feb. 3, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Maastricht 
University School of Business’s Department of Economics), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1999090. 
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credibly promising rewards to that government,”315 which Tarullo identifies 
as one of “three broad strategies that might be pursued alone or in 
combination to induce other governments to enforce their anti-bribery 
laws.”316 
Rationalist theories of international law and international relations 
view international organizations as most successful when functioning as 
information-producing institutions.
317
  The information produced by 
international organizations can be used by states to monitor the compliance 
of counterparties to those agreements.  International organizations can also 
serve as mechanisms for states to transfer side-payments to treaty partners 
for whom the benefits of compliance would not otherwise exceed the costs.  
As the next subpart will show, the OECD Working Group is an 
international organization well-positioned to perform both roles. 
3.  OECD Working Group’s Role in Improving Enforcement 
While other, analogous international organizations could also be 
considered,
318
 the OECD Working Group is a natural candidate for 
receiving disgorgement funds, as it was specifically designed to address the 
collective action problem described above.
319
  Funding the Working Group 
would also be broadly consistent with the foreign policy prerogatives of the 
United States, as the Working Group is the product of a treaty that was 
modeled after the FCPA and which came into being largely through U.S. 
 
 315 See Tarullo, supra note 12, at 690–91. 
 316 Id. 
 317 See ROBERT KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD 
POLITICAL ECONOMY 17, 92 (1984) (“The policy implications of the book stem most directly 
from my emphasis on the value of information produced and distributed by international 
regimes . . . .  From the perspective of market-failure theories, the informational functions of 
regimes are the most important of all.”); Andrew T. Guzman, International Tribunals: A 
Rational Choice Analysis, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 171, 179–80 (2008) (“This observation—that 
tribunals serve to provide information—guides the analysis that follows. The goal here is to 
develop a theory capable of explaining how information can influence state behavior and 
encourage compliance with international law.”). 
 318 The closest alternative would be the Conference of States Parties (CoSP) established 
under the UNCAC.  See G.A. Res. 58/4, supra note 11, art. 63.1 (“A Conference of the 
States Parties to the Convention is hereby established to improve the capacity of and 
cooperation between States Parties to achieve the objectives set forth in this Convention and 
to promote and review its implementation.”). 
 319 See WORKING GRP. ON BRIBERY IN INT’L BUS. TRANSACTIONS, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-
OPERATION & DEV., 2007 ANNUAL REPORT 11 (2008), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/briberyininternationalbusiness/anti-
briberyconvention/40896091.pdf (“The Working Group’s most important role is to support 
country-level implementation of the OECD anti-bribery instruments.  The monitoring 
process aims to ensure that all Parties have in place a sound system to fight foreign bribery 
that complies with the Convention’s high standards.”). 
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  Furthermore, the United States plays a leading role in the 
Working Group’s parent organization, the OECD, and could expect to 
retain significant influence over the programs and priorities to which 
disgorged funds are directed.
321
 
The core function of the Working Group is to gather the information 
necessary to monitor and evaluate member states’ compliance with the 
OECD Convention.
322
  This involves country visits by experts from peer 
governments and meetings with local prosecutors and representatives from 
the private sector and civil society.
323
  Reviews also “probe OECD states to 
determine whether their governments have legal loopholes (such as short 
statutes of limitations), whether they provide sufficient resources for 
enforcement, and whether local corporations have adequate compliance 
programs.”324 
The Working Group evaluates each member state and develops 
individual country reports through a three phase process: Phase 1 evaluates 
the adequacy of a country’s legislation to implement the Convention;325 
Phase 2 assesses whether a country is applying this legislation 
effectively;
326
 and Phase 3 focuses on enforcement of the Convention, the 
 
 320 Indira Carr & Opi Outhwaite, The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention Ten Years On, 5 
MANCHESTER J. INT’L ECON. L. 3, 6 (2008) (“The prime mover for the OECD to take steps to 
combat corruption of foreign public officials was pressure applied by the United States 
(US).”); see also Abbott & Snidal, supra note 5, at S161–62; cf. Ashe, supra note 7, at 
2908–09 (explaining other factors that bolstered U.S. efforts). 
 321 For example, the United States contributed nearly twenty-two percent of the OECD’s 
general 2012 budget, the largest amount among member states by a wide margin.  Member 
Countries’ Budget Contributions for 2012, ORG. ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., 
http://www.oecd.org/about/budget/membercountriesbudgetcontributionsfor2012.htm (last 
visited Jan. 3, 2013). 
 322 See OECD Convention, supra note 10, art. 12 (“Monitoring and Follow-Up: The 
Parties shall co-operate in carrying out a programme of systematic follow-up to monitor and 
promote the full implementation of this Convention.  [T]his shall be done in the framework 
of the OECD Working Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions and 
according to its terms of reference.”). 
 323 Ben W. Heineman, Jr. & Fritz Heimann, The Long War Against Corruption, FOREIGN 
AFF., May/June 2006, at 75, 80. 
 324 Id. 
 325 Phase 1 Country Monitoring of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, ORG. ECON. CO-
OPERATION & DEV.,  
http://www.oecd.org/document/21/0,3746,en_2649_34859_2022613_1_1_1_1,00.html  (last 
visited Jan. 2, 2013) (“The principal objective of Phase 1 is to evaluate whether the legal 
texts through which participants implement the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention meet the 
standard set by the Convention.”). 
 326 Phase 2 Country Monitoring of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, ORG. ECON. CO-
OPERATION & DEV., 
http://www.oecd.org/document/27/0,3746,en_2649_34859_2022939_1_1_1_1,00.html (last 
visited Jan. 2, 2013). 
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2009 Anti-Bribery Recommendation, and outstanding recommendations 
from Phase 2.
327
  To date, these efforts are incomplete but nonetheless 
substantial: over two-thirds of all OECD parties have been reviewed.
328
  
Also, this review has not been without teeth, as the Working Group “has 
demonstrated its credibility by criticizing the [C]onvention’s inadequate 
implementation in major countries such as France, Japan, Italy, and the 
United Kingdom.”329  Transferring disgorged profits to the Working Group 
would provide the resources necessary for it to pursue its current 
monitoring activities in a deeper and more complete manner. 
With more funding, the current functions of the Working Group could 
also be expanded or made more robust.  Noting the limitations of the 
backgrounds of current Working Group officials,
330
 Tarullo proposes 
establishing a sub-group of prosecutors within the Working Group, with its 
role outlined as follows: 
The direct objectives of an OECD committee of prosecutors  would 
be to ensure: first, efficient exchanges of information pertaining to 
specific instances of bribery and, second, good faith investigation by 
the home-country prosecutors of companies implicated by such 
information . . . Relationships might [also] be initiated with legal 




The OECD has not yet created a standing committee of prosecutors, but it 
has taken initial steps to coordinate with prosecutors, private sector and 
civil society groups, and other international anti-corruption organizations.
332
  
These efforts could be formalized and deepened. 
Another possibility is to use disgorgement funds to establish inflows of 
information from untapped sources, such as TI and competing multinational 
 
 327 Phase 3 Country Monitoring of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, ORG. ECON. CO-
OPERATION & DEV., 
http://www.oecd.org/document/31/0,3746,en_2649_34859_44684959_1_1_1_1,00.html (last 
visited Nov. 17, 2012) (“The Working Group on Bribery adopted a post-Phase 2 assessment 
mechanism in December 2009, to act as a permanent cycle of peer review, involving 
systematic on-site visits as a shorter and more focused assessment mechanism than for Phase 
2.”). 
 328 Heineman, Jr. & Heimann, supra note 323. 
 329 Id. 
 330 See Tarullo, supra note 12, at 697 (“There is reason to doubt that the officials from 
economics, foreign, and finance ministries who sit as national representatives on the OECD 
Working Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions are particularly well-
informed concerning specific instances of bribery.”). 
 331 Id. at 701. 
 332 See WORKING GRP. ON BRIBERY IN INT’L BUS. TRANSACTIONS, supra note 319, at 30–
42. 
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 thereby enabling the Working Group to function as a 
“clearinghouse” for allegations concerning transnational bribery.334  Other 
helpful institutional innovations could be imagined that would be consistent 




The OECD Working Group could also increase the reputational effects 
of its monitoring efforts by applying more resources to rigorously verify 
and publicize the degree of compliance of its members.
336
  Other proposals 
exist that would complement the reputation effect of heightened publicity of 
non-compliance, such as the idea to “tier” membership into levels 
indicating each member’s progress in complying with the treaty.337 
Transfers to the OECD Working Group may also serve as an effective 
compliance tool by allowing side-payments to other member states.  The 
Working Group is well-situated to deliver side-payments, because it is 
embedded within the larger OECD, an institution used to coordinate a 
variety of international policies.
338
  International organizations that span 
multiple issue areas, such as the OECD, are good for side-payments, 
because the “clustering of issues under a regime facilitates side-payments 
among these issues: more potential quids are available for the quo.”339  
While the strategic positions of particular OECD treaty members is difficult 
to specify in advance, channeling side-payments through the OECD 
Working Group is one available “carrot” that could tip the cost-benefit 
analysis for member states otherwise disinclined to comply with 
 
 333 See Tarullo, supra note 12, at 701 (“Simply by establishing some kind of international 
‘tipster’s line’ with an email address and a postal box at the OECD, the committee may 
obtain information from a variety of heretofore untapped sources.”). 
 334 See ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 104, at 190 (suggesting that the International 
Monetary Fund and/or World Bank take such an initiative). 
 335  See Cheng Wenhao & Umme Aiman Ahmad, Implementing International Law to 
Fight Business Bribery, 5 AFR. J. BUS. MGMT. 12392, 12397–98 (2011) (describing initiatives 
to generate greater awareness and scrutiny of corruption); A New Push on Corruption, in 
OECD YEARBOOK 2011: BETTER POLICIES FOR BETTER LIVES 61 (2011), available at 
http://issuu.com/oecdobserver/docs/oecdyearbook2011 (discussing OECD initiatives to raise 
awareness of corruption and strengthen regulation). 
 336 See Andrew Tyler, Note, Enforcing Enforcement: Is the OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention’s Peer Review Effective?, 43 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 137, 156 (2011) (“The 
final and most important tool the [Working Group] has, and one it has not fully used yet, is 
the ‘shame game’-the use of all the Convention’s influence to publicly pressure a non-
complying country into compliance through public statements and press releases designed to 
ignite both international and domestic pressure to bring about a change of policy.”). 
 337 Wenhao & Ahmad, supra note 335, at 12399. 
 338 See Topics, ORG. ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., http://www.oecd.org (follow “Topics” 
hyperlink) (listing a welter of global issues the OECD works on, including the economy, 
finance, environment, innovation, and so on) (last visited Jan. 2, 2013). 
 339 KEOHANE, supra note 317, at 91. 






The idea to bolster the resources and capacity of the OECD Working 
Group is a more effective way to remedy international under-enforcement 
than pursuing more legalistic initiatives.  One set of proposals likely to be 
less efficacious contemplates establishing an international tribunal 
dedicated to hearing and resolving claims arising out of contracts procured 
through bribes.
341
  However, most international tribunals charged with 
adjudicating criminal conduct have been met with mixed success,
342
 and 
those tasked with purely contractual disputes would face serious 
jurisdictional and enforceability problems.
343
  The one exceptionally 
successful international court is the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO),
344
 but it provides a poor analogue for 
what would be required of a bribery-based court.
345
 
Another recommendation is to create a private right of action under the 
FCPA.
346
  But a private right of action may suffer from emboldening 
competitors to sue one another after each unsuccessful bidding contest, and 
could encourage the same sort of anti-competitive abuses that are common 
with competitor-initiated antitrust claims.
347
  The private litigation proposal 
is also susceptible to general criticisms that often apply to claims that “more 
litigation is the answer” to complicated global problems.348  A more prudent 
 
 340 See Tarullo, supra note 12. 
 341 See ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 104, at 193–96. 
 342 The International Criminal Court, for one, has yet to impose a single sentence.  See 
Tim Lister, ‘International Justice Works’—But Maybe Not That Well, CNN (May 28, 2011, 
8:06 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2011/POLITICS/05/28/obama.icc/index.html.  Criminal 
tribunals for war crimes in Yugoslavia and Rwanda have alson been under-productive.  See 
POSNER, supra note 304, at 196 (“[T]he ICTY [Yugoslavia] and ICTR [Rwanda] had a joint 
two-year budget of $545 million in 2006–2007, more than one-eighth of the UN’s entire 
budget . . . .  [T]hrough July 2008 the ICTY and the ICTY have convicted only a few dozen 
defendants.”). 
 343 See ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 104, at 195. 
 344 The DSB is governed by rules set out in the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding 
(DSU).  Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, annex 2, 1869 
U.N.T.S. 401. 
 345 The WTO DSB reviews alleged breaches of treaty obligations between states, and not 
criminal claims against individual persons or corporations based on domestic statutes.  See 
id. art. 1, app. 1; Guzman, supra note 317, at 225 (“Among international tribunals, the 
WTO’s Appellate Body (AB) is arguably the most like domestic courts.”). 
 346 Sandy A. Azer, Strengthening the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Through a Private 
Right of Action, at 12–16 (Aug. 2010) (unpublished working paper) (on file with the Social 
Science Research Network) (advocating for an additional, private right of action for FCPA 
violations). 
 347 See generally William Breit & Kenneth G. Elzinga, Private Antitrust Enforcement: 
The New Learning, 28 J.L. & ECON. 405 (1985). 
 348 See POSNER, supra note 304, at 207–25, 225 (“[R]egulation by litigation has its 
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approach would be to channel competitor complaints through the OECD 
Working Group “clearinghouse” and allow member states to evaluate and 
respond to allegations of bribery as they deem appropriate in light of OECD 
Convention requirements. 
In contrast to the aforementioned suggestions, this Article’s approach 
plays more to the comparative institutional advantage of international 
organizations.  As international relations scholar Robert Keohane puts it: 
“[I]nternational regimes are valuable to governments not because they 
enforce binding rules on others (they do not), but because they render it 
possible for governments to enter into mutually beneficial agreements with 
one another.  They empower governments rather than shackling them.”349  
Creating a more robust OECD monitoring mechanism would empower 
member states to mutually police one another’s compliance with treaty 
obligations already in place that require the prosecution of nationals 
engaged in foreign bribery. 
This Part has provided a two-pronged proposal for reducing the 
problem of under-enforcement of prohibitions on transnational bribery.  On 
the demand-side, transferring disgorged profits to Host countries 
cooperative with the underlying investigation would incentivize information 
sharing and provide resources to further reform domestic anti-corruption.  
On the supply-side, transferring disgorgement revenue to the OECD 
Working Group would enhance its ability to monitor transnational bribery, 
a critical step in facilitating the mutual-policing required to overcome 
collective action problems.  As with the analysis of over-enforcement in 
Part III, the solutions proposed here focus on modifying the sub-optimal 
incentives facing key actors responsible for anti-bribery enforcement. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Transnational bribery is a serious global problem that suffers from 
both over-enforcement and under-enforcement.  The rise in FCPA 
enforcement has led to the Act being applied in an extremely broad manner 
that deters legitimate foreign investment and offends procedural rule-of-law 
principles.  Meanwhile, bribery is practically unenforced by other capital-
exporting members of the OECD and lower-income countries where corrupt 
transactions most often take place. 
Scholarship on the FCPA alternately decries the Act’s over-zealous 
enforcement or defends the hard line that, because bribery is undesirable, 
prosecutions pursuant to the FCPA or other international agreements should 
be encouraged and even increased.  Each side takes an overly legalistic 
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approach by proposing slightly more restrictive statutory definitions on the 
one hand, or broader provisions and bolder international agreements on the 
other.  Discussion at recent congressional hearings concerning possible 
amendments to the FCPA has taken the same form. 
However, enforcement of transnational anti-bribery measures is 
dysfunctional because of underlying political economy problems facing the 
relevant governments and their bureaucracies, not because of defectively 
drafted legal instruments.  To more appropriately align the incentives of 
domestic and international actors responsible for deterring bribery, this 
Article proposes that the SEC divert disgorgement revenue from the U.S. 
Treasury to Host countries where bribery takes place and the OECD 
Working Group.  Transferring disgorged profits in this manner would tend 
to reduce the rent-seeking opportunities that lead U.S. Enforcement 
Agencies to pursue unbalanced over-enforcement.  At the same time, it 
would reverse the free-riding calculus facing Host countries responsible for 
the demand-side of bribery, and OECD member states on the supply-side, 
both of which are currently overly reliant on U.S. enforcement efforts. 
The policy proposed in this Article is intended to provide a creative, 
global approach to dealing with the important problem of transnational 
bribery and developing world corruption.  It can also be understood as an 
attempt to solve an increasingly common form of regulatory dilemma—
concerning business, trade, and the environment—for  which the  United 
States can no longer hope to be effective by taking a unilateral approach.  
Globalization of the economy increases the number of state and private 
actors relevant to any particular policy area and multiplies opportunities for 
regulatory arbitrage.  Finding solutions to the new breed of cross-border 
regulatory problems therefore requires imagining strategic, multilateral 
policies that are attentive to the interests and capacities of the various 
international actors involved. 
 
